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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to compare the political
efforts of two, similar, public interest group coalitions,
and to analyze the reasons for the failure of the one and
the success of the other.
A detailed study of the Alaska Public Interest Coaliton,
which operated from 1969 until 19 74 and the Alaska Lands
Coalition, which operated from 1978 until 1980, was under
taken.
Areas of study included the strategies and tactics
each employed in seeking to influence ..Congress, the President
and the Courts.
It was found that the Alaska Public Interest Coalition
was a narrow-based coalition, which concentrated mainly on
legal maneuvers and congressional testimony, while the
Alaska Lands Coalition was a broad-based coalition, which
concentrated on personal lobbying, grass-root support, and
utilization of Presidential influence.
The results suggest that the usefulness of the information
a coalition provides, the methods of its presentation, and the
choice of individuals the coalition seeks to influence, all play
an important role in determining the success or failure of a
public interest group coalition.
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PARTICIPATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL COALITIONS
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY

CHAPTER ONE

- The development of public policy has long been a major
concern of political scientists.

Much effort has been de

voted in attempts to categorize and explain the complicated
processes and sequences of events involved in its formation
and implementation.

Knowledge about the role of interest

groups in this process is basic to a clear understanding
of the subject.
Discussions on the origin, nature and activities of
interest groups in American politics can be traced back to
James Madison.

He argued that one of the virtues of the

then proposed Union would be its ability to,

"Break and

control the voilence of faction...The regulation of these
various and interfering interests forms the principle task
of modern legislation."^-

Madison's thinking about factions

was widely appreciated in his day, but it underscored
the deep ambivalence toward such groups that has always
existed.

Since his time the prevailing opinion about

groups has changed many times.
No such ambivalence existed in the mind of John C.
Calhoun.

According to Peter Drucker,
What makes Calhoun so important as a major
key in the understanding of American politics

Ijames Madison, The Federalist Papers, "Federalist Paper
Number 10," (New York: New American Library, 1961), p. 79.

2

is not just that he saw the importance in
American political life of sectional and
interest pluralism,... But Calhoun, perhaps
alone, saw in it more than just a rule of
expedience, imposed by a country's size
...He saw in it a basic principle of free
government .2
In this century, political theorists have viewed society
as an aggregation of competing interest groups.

Chief

among such thinkers is Arthur Bentley, who, in The Process
of Government

(first published in 1908) wrote:

We shall never find a group interest of the
society as a whole.
We shall always find
that the political interests and activities
of any given group--and there are no political
phenomena except group phenomena— are directed
against the activities of men, who appear in
other groups, political or otherwise... The
society itself is nothing other than the
complex of the groups that compose it.^
Bentley saw the activities of groups as fundamental to both
the economic and political arenas.

"The great task in the

study of any social life is the analysis of these groups," he
explained,
is stated."

"When the groups are adequately stated, everything
4

Virginia Held,

in her discussion of preponderance theor

ies, says this about Bentley:
In Bentley's view, every group has an interest.
He uses the terms, in fact, almost interchangably.
(For him) it is the individual apart
from the group which is artificial.
'"The indivi-

2

.

.

.

Michael P. Smith, ed.
American Politics and Public
Policy, "A Key to American Politics: Calhoun's Pluralism"
(New York: Random House, 1973), p. 27.
3
Arthur Bentley, The Process of Government (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1908), p. 222.
4 Ibid.,

p. 208-209.

4
dual stated for himself, and invested with an
extra social unity of his own, is a fiction."'5
However, it is important to note that Bentley does, on the
whole, think that the resulting outcome of this group
interaction is generally acceptable.

As Mancur Olson wrote,

Not only was the resultant of all the group
pressures always the determinant of social
policy, but it was also, in Bentley's mind,
a reasonably just determinant.
Groups had
a degree of power more or less in proportion
to their numbers.
The larger, more nearly
general interest would usually tend to
defeat the smaller, narrow special interest . 6
A basic assumption which underlies this thinking is that
a group may form, composed of interests outside the formal
structure of government, and actively (and often effectively)
work towards influencing governmental policy.

This assump

tion is commonly referred to as the pluralist perspective,
and over the years it has received support from many distin
guished theorists.

—

For example, Robert Dahl, in his book,

ace t° Democratic Theory, wrote that there is a, "High

probability that

an active and legitimate group in the

ulation can make

itself heard effectively at some crucial

stage in the process of

d e c i s i o n . " 7

pop

The foundation of Amer

ican pluralist thinking rests on the belief that any group
which organizes and operates within the boundaries established

^Virginia Held, The Public Interest and Individual
Interests (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970), p. 79.
^Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of Collective Action
(New York: Schocken Books^ 1968), p. 121.
^Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 145.

by society has a chance to achieve effective access in the
government's decision-making process.
central points in Bentley's argument,
can.be traced to current times,
in 1950,10 Dahl
MacFarland m

(again)

1969,

13

This is one of the

g

and similar thinking

from Mydral in 1944,

9

Truman

in 1961,11 Milbrath in 1963,12

and Held in 1970.

14

Of course, over the years pluralist thinking has been
subject to a certain amount of criticism.

This criticism

has centered on the pluralist assumption that all groups
will have an equal opportunity to gain access into the
policy-making process.

Ornstein and Elder,

in Interest

Groups, Lobbying and Po1icymaking, discuss those theorists
who find problems implicit in pluralistic thinking.
ent in this category is E.E. Schattschneider, who,

Promin
"Attacked

the operation of groups in the American political process
on the basis of what he regarded as a profound upper-class

g

Gunnar Mydral, An American Dilemma
and Brothers, 1944), p. 80.

(New York; Harper

9 Ibid.

"^David Truman, The Governmental Process
Alfred A. Knopf, 1950).
■^Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs?
Press, 1961.

(New York:

(New Haven: Yale University

12 Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation
Rand McNally, 1965).
13

Andrew S. McFarland, Public Interest Lobbies
ton D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976).
14

(Chicago;
(Washing

Held. Public Interests and Individual Interests.

6
bias and distortion by the groups of the public i n t e r e s t 15
In The Semi-Sovereign People he said:
The vice of groupist theory is that it
conceals the most significant aspects of
the system.
The flaw of the pluralist
heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings
with a strong upper-class accent.
Probably
about ninety percent of the people cannot
get into the pressure system. 1 ®
In 196 9, Theodore L o w i .claimed, in his book The End
of Liberalism, that the notion of interest groups as both
good and necessary meant that government was losing its
basic sense of authority by handing over to private groups
the ability to determine the direction of policy develop
ment.

The result, he felt, was distorted and unrepresenta

tive policy, benefitting the few and corrupting the function
ing of government.1 *^
Critics of pluralist philosophy such as Lowi, Schattschneider, and Mancur Olson believe that the American system
is, in fact, not open to all groups seeking access to the
decision making process.

Those most likely to succeed are

groups which represent powerful, well-financed interests,
while others, even if they represent the "public goodj" are
likely to fail either because they are underfinanced, or lack
the expertise necessary to achieve effective access.

-^Norman J. Ornstein and Shirley Elder, Interest Groups,
Lobbying, and Policymaking (Washington D . C . : Congressional
Quarterly Press, 1978), p. 14-15.
l^E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 35.
^ T h e o d o r e Lowi, The End of Liberalism
1969), p. 40-41.

(New

(New York: Norton,

In recent years, attention concerning the success of
group participation in the development of public policy has
been focused, in part, on public interest groups,

A public

interest group may be defined as one which seeks a collective
good, the achievement of which will not selectively benefit
the membership or the activists of the o r g a n i z a t i o n . D a v i d
Truman, in The Governmental Process, tells of the need for
an interest group to speak in terms of "the public interest."
When a group is perceived as working on behalf of a public
good or necessity, he believes that its chance for success
is greatly increased.
When trying to influence public policy , a public
interest group can choose from a variety of strategies and
tactics.

A strategy may be defined as a broad plan of attack,

or a general approach.

A tactic, on the other hand, is a

specific action designed to influence a policy decision.
Within a strategy, therefore, there are numerous tactics
available.
Jeffrey M. Berry, in Lobbying For The People, notes
four "strategies of influence," available to public interest
groups.

These are: Law, embarassment and confrontation,

information, and constituency influence and pressure.
The first of these, legal action, is effective as both
a primary, as well as a secondary,

strategy.

As a primary

ISjeffrey M. Berry, Lobbying For The People
Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 7.
1 9 Ibid.,

pp. 263-272.

(Princeton:

action, the law may be used to obtain a temporary injunction
allowing time for action to be taken outside the courts.

Or

it may be used by those groups who still want to work within
the system, without having to 'stoop to p o l i t i c s . ' ^

p or

other groups, it is an alternative to be used when all
else fails.

It must be remembered though, that unless the

constitutionality of the controversial action is being
tested, injunctions are nearly always temporary,

likely

to be appealed, and often decided outside the courts r
Embarassment and confrontation includes tactics such
as political protests, whistle blowing, and shareholders
actions;

and is normally used only by groups which will not

be listened to, or cannot achieve access through normal
channels.

Schattschneider states that:

Private conflicts are taken into the
public arena precisely because someone
wants to make certain that the power
ratio among private interests most
immediately involved shall not prevail .2 1
Groups which employ the third strategy, information,
rely on such tactics as personal lobbying, congressional
testimony, and releasing research results and internal
publicity to the press.

99

.
. .
This is an important activity

for many public interest groups.

It is less hostile in

nature than embarassment and confrontation, and it assumes
a good working relationship with Congress.

9n

Berry, Lobbying For The Peop l e , p. 267.

^-^-Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People, p. 38.
22eerry, Lobbying For The People, p. 269.

9
Berry believes that groups which are characterized
by the fourth strategy, constituency and pressure, come
23
closest to fitting the image of a "pressure group. 11
Utilization of this strategy involves tactics such as
urging members to write their Congressmen, publicizing
voting records,

and

(if possible) making campaign contributions

supporting or opposing a decision-maker's re-election bid.
While public interest groups may sometimes be class
ified as special interest groups, there are a few key dis
tinctions.

A special interest group will seek benefits which

occur primarily to its members, while a public interest
group seeks benefits which occur throughout society.

Very

often they are non-profit organizations, relying on volunteer
efforts to a greater extent than most special interest
groups.

Additionally,

their memberships are usually composed

of private individuals, who pay a membership fee to be a part
of the organization.

Examples of public interest groups

include consumer activist groups and environmental organ
izations .
Berry also notes the contributions of public interest
groups in American political life.

In addition to shaping

the political agenda by bringing new issues into public
view, and using litigation to perform a type of "law
enforcement" function by obtaining judicial rulings:
Public interest groups play an important
role in facilitating the political partici
pation of their members and related attentive

23

Ber r yf Lobbying for the People, p. 271.

10

publics.
The organizations not only activate
supporters and constituents, but they also
provide meaningful channels through which
participation can be directed.^4
One of the most potentially important actions a public
interest group can take is to form a coalition with other,
like-minded groups.

Berry noted that seventy-six percent

of the public interest activists he surveyed described
"joint activity with other organizations," as "important"
or "very important."25

James Deakin, in his book The

Lobbyists, notes that virtually every major issue that
comes before Congress involves some cross lobbying or
intergroup lobbying, and that lobbyists generally put
much faith in such efforts.2 6

Cooperative lobbying such

as this may be defined simply as efforts of an alliance of
interest groups

(however temporary or unstable)

to influence

government. 27
In Lobbying For The People, Berry describes three
types of alliances, or coalitions, in which public interest
groups are involved.

The first, dependent coalitions, are:

Those where one group dominates in both

^Berry,

Lobbying For The P e o p l e , p. 2 87.

2^Ibid., p . 254.
^ J a m e s Deakin, The Lobbyists, (Washington D . C . : Public
Affairs Press, 1966), p. 219.
^ D o n a l d R. Hall, Cooperative Lobbying. The Power of
Pressure (Tuscon: University of Arizona P r e s s , 1969), p.~xi.

11

active participation and resource commitment.
Other groups will act in concert with the
dominant group during major lobbying efforts,
but their participation in the coalition's
decision-making tends to be of a secondary
nature .2 8
In the second type, called a participatory coalition,
No one group is dominant, although a single
member group may have a major leadership
or coordinating role.
At least two organ
izations are highly active and supportive
in a participatory coalition...Most frequently
participatory coalitions are ad hoc working
arrangements that do not lend themselves
29
to institutionalized or permanent arrangements.
Finally,

independent coalitions are those which tend to

have a, "much greater permanence than participatory
coalitions as well as an independent staff and a distinct
30
identity from a member group."
Various authors have given reasons for this inclination
to form coalitions.

Donald Hall, in Cooperative Lobbying -

The Power of Pressure, states that,

"Economic self-interest

is probably the m a m motive behind group cooperation."
He also mentions the benefits of information exchange,

31
shared

goals and ideology, and the appearance of a unified front
in Congress.
Organization structure and base of support are of
particular interest to Abraham Holtzman.

In Interest Groups

and Lobbying, he describes the importance for a coalition

28

Berry, Lobbying for the People, p. 265.

3 0 Ibid.,

31

p. 258.

Hall, Cooperative Lobbying, p. 46.

12

to, "Threaten to marshal its mass membership base against
the legislator during the next

e l e c t i o n ,

"32 and notes

that:
Failure to create an association of groups
may result in a babble of voices being
heard, none of which are really concerned
with the interests of the others in the
more inclusive groups of which they are
m e m bers.33
Even if the various groups share common goals or ideology,
without the control of a central organization to set policy
and coordinate actions, confusion and disarray is usually
the result.

This could have the effect of splintering the

group, and removing the reason for joining the coalition
to begin with.
Questions about whether or not to join an interest
group, or coalition of interest groups, to begin with, high
lights Mancur Olson's thinking.

In The Logic of Collective

A c t i o n , he stated that rational individuals have little real
incentive to participate in large interest groups
coalitions)

(or

because the costs of participation will usually

exceed any joint payoffs.
Olson suggested that individuals joined in
collective or group activity only when
membership provided selective benefits,
(for example recreational, social or
economic), when membership is compulsory
(for example a closed union shop), or
where the group is small enough that an
individual feels he or she is vital to

32Abraham Holtzman, Interest Groups and Lobbying
York: The MacMillian Company, 1966), p. 27.
33ibid., p . 37.

(New

13
the group's s u c c e s s . ^
What lies underneath the surface of this thinking is
the belief that broad public interest groups, or public
interest group coalitions, will rarely be successful
because there are too few incentives for individuals to
actively participate.

oc

J

A lobbying organization ..Iworking in the
interests of a large group of firms or
workers in some industry, would get no
assistance from the rational individuals
in that industry.
This would be true
even if everyone in the industry were
absolutely convinced that the proposed
program was in their best interest.36
Hall also notes the obstacles that can sometimes hinder
effective coalition formation:
Group alliances may be discouraged by many
factors, the more important of which may be
...the existence of jurisdictional problems
severe enough to cause continuing friction
and thus prevent logical cooperation... groups
may be afraid to cooperate with each other
for fear of adverse reaction from the
press, public, government and other alliances,
(and) there may exist prohibitive situational
factors largely not under control of the
group.37
The subject of this study will be a specific type
of public interest coalition— those composed of environ
mental organizations.

These are groups which are concerned

34ornstein and Elder, Interest G r oups, Lobbying and
Policy M a k i n g , p. 17.
3 5 I b i d .,

p. 18

3^Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective A c t i o n , p. 127.
37nall, Cooperative Lobbying, p. 127.
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about the impact of mankind on his natural surroundings.
Their activities include fighting for strict controls on
pollution, advocating the development of ‘clean' energy
sources such as solar power, and seeking to limit or ban
altogether, development of wilderness areas.

Initally

receiving attention during the late sixties, one of the
first major legislative victories for the environmentalist
movement was the enactment of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, which followed the Santa Barbara oil
spill of that same year.

Since that time the legislative

record of the environmental movement Jtias been varied; it
has been overshadowed at times by such issues as the war
in Viet Nam and the energy crisis.
From 1969 to 1973 and again in 1978 to 1980, Congress
and the President were forced to confront two Alaskan
issues of particular concern to environmental organizations.
The first was the decision to build the Alaskan pipeline,
and the other was the settlement of federal land claims
in the state.

Both issues drew considerable attention from

environmental organizations, and both necessitated the
formation of coalitions to effectively lobby the appropriate
Congressional decision-makers.

What makes these two

examples especially interesting is that in each case the
coalitions were comprised of almost identical groups, and
had similar goals? yet in 197 3 the environmental coalition
failed, whereas in 1980 it was successful.
several interesting questions.

This raises

Why was the environmental

coalition successful in one instance and unsuccessful in

15
the other?

Were similar tactics of influence employed in

each situation?

What lessons about coalition formation from

1973 were the coalition members able to apply in the period
197.8 to 1980?
The purpose of this study will be to explore these
questions in order to examine the formation of public
interest group coalitions, and their participation in the
policy development process.

The issues and concepts

discussed earlier provide the theoretical framework which
will guide the study.

Whether or not the ideas regarding

interest groups, coalition formation, and policy development
as expressed by these authors are applicable to the afore
mentioned situations will become apparent during the course
of this study.

In any case, the Alaskan pipeline and the

Alaska lands issue both provide excellent means for studying
the activities of public interest group coalition participa
tion in the governmental process.

Both coalitions sought

to influence public policy, were involved in congressional
lobbying, received much attention from the press and from
scholarly researchers, and put much time, effort, and faith
in their actions.

Whatever they may be, the reasons for the

coalition*s failure in 1973 and its success in 1980 will
provide the basis for the conclusions to be reached by this
study.
Chapter two will focus on the passage of the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973, concentrating on the
coalition involved, the tactics they employed in Congress,
and the outcome of their participation.

This will be

16
followed by a similar analysis of the development of the
Alaska lands bill in chapter three.

In chapter four a

comparison of the two cases will be made, contrasting
the strategies and tactics of the first coalition with that
of the second, in an attempt to understand why the coalition
failed in 1973 and was successful seven years later.
Awareness of the strategies used by the coalitions,
knowing why they were chosen, and understanding why they may
or may not have been successful will be useful in comparing
the two situations.

This, in turn, will be helpful in

arriving at some conclusions regarding public interest
groups and coalition formation, which well be contained in
chapter five.

"

CHAPTER TWO

The possibility of oil deposits existing in Alaska
was known to the United States government almost from the
turn of the century.

Several American companies tried to

enter geologic survey claims on the North Slope, inside the
Arctic Circle, in 1921.-*-

That action served to raise the

interest of the government.

Prior to World War I, it had

been setting aside petroleum reserves to assure a fuel
supply for U. S. naval ships: Elk Hills and Buena Vista in
California in 1912, and Teapot Dome in Wyoming in 1915.
President Warren G. Harding added the largest of all in
1923: Naval Petroleum Reserve Number 4, a tract of twentythree million acres on the western North Slope of Alaska.
After World War II, some smaller oil companies began
exploration on areas surrounding Petroleum Reserve Number
4.

In 1957, the Richfield Oil Corporation of California

drilled a successful well nearby.

"Further wells confirmed

a field estimated at 175 million barrels.

Natural gas

deposits were also found, and a few years later, another
oil f i e l d . B y

the late 1960's more than fifty onshore

wells were operating, but the quantities thus far located

-*-James P. Roscow, 800 Miles to Valdez
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, I n c . , 1977), p. 52.
2 Ibid.
2 Ibid.,

p. 53.
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(Englewood Cliffs,
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were not sufficient to justify a major undertaking.

As

Bryan Cooper said in his book Alaska - The Last Frontier,
It was not good enough just to find oil.
There had to be enough of it to be worth
producing commercially... The main problem
was finding a reserve large enough to
justify economic recovery from this remote
and harsh region.4
That is exactly what happened in February,

1968.

At that time ARCO sunk a well into Prudhoe Bay, offshore
from the North Slope.

By June, the existence of an oil

field containing an estimated ten billion barrels had been
confirmed.
deposit

Prudhoe Bay is still the largest petroleum
ever discovered in the

about one hundred times

United States.

Itwas also

more oil than anyone had ever

discovered in Northern Alaska.
In Anchorage, on February 10, 1969, the three major
lease holders in the area--Atlantic Richfield, British
Petroleum,

and Humble Oil

to build a pipeline.

(Exxon)— announced their intention

After studying the various alternatives

they felt that this was the most practical way to transport
the oil from its current, almost inaccessable, location.
It was to be a forty-eight inch wide line, running eight
hundred miles from Prudhoe Bay, south to Valdez, a small
fishing village on the Gulf of Alaska, with an ice-free
deep water port.

Here it would be loaded on to giant tank

ers, and taken to existing refineries on the west coast of
the United States.

The pipeline was to be owned by an

4
Bryan Cooper, Alaska - The Last Frontier
Hutchinson and Company, 1972), p. 77.

(London:

19
organization known as TAPS

[Trans-Alaska Pipeline System]

which in turn was to be owned by the pipeline subsidiaries
of the three partners.

In the future if other companies

needed to bring oil from Prudhoe Bay, they would be invited
to share in the pipeline's

o w n e r s h i p . ^

When the full extent of the reserve became known, other
oil companies began purchasing land leases around Prudhoe
Bay.

Eventually TAPS would be succeeded by the Alyeska

Pipeline Service Company, composed of the three original
members of TAPS, plus Mobil Oil Company, Phillips Petroleum,
Union Oil of California, Amerada Hess Corporation, and Home
Oil of Canada (which later dropped out of the project) .
To begin construction, no matter where the location,
permits are required, and in Alaska the immediate construc
tion problem was not the pipeline.

The first priority was

to build an all-weather supply road to move the heavy con
struction equipment and supplies to places where they were
needed.

Through 1968 there was no road at all north of the

Yukon River, and in 1969 the only existing route was a
roughly cut trail, dubbed the "Hickel Highway," after
Alaska's governor Walter J. Hickel, and it was only use
ful until the spring thaw.^
In the past, as James P. Roscow notes in his book
800 Miles to V a l d e z , pipeliners seldom had trouble getting
permits.

Even before Humble and ARCO sent their first

^Roscow,

800 Miles to Vald e z , p. 21.

^Cooper, Alaska - The Last Frontier, p. 224.
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engineers to Alaska, they requested and received permits
to start

field

s u r v e y s .

7

However,

To build a pipeline through virgin wilderness
— with a road needed to start construction,
and a new terminal to be built from bedrock
up— would likely require an unusual number
of permits.8
These, it seemed, were not going to be granted quickly.
There were two problems: the first was that Alaska was
almost entirely public land.

The Alaska Statehood Act

of 19 59 gave the state the right to select 103.5 million
acres of land as state land, but this had not yet been
done.

Secondly, the statehood law barred state selection

of any land historically claimed by Alaska's Native Eskimo
population.

Again, little work had been done to resolve

conflicting claims.^
On June 6, 1969*

TAPS filed an application for

An oil pipeline right-of-way, together
with two additional rights-of-way for
ingress and egress to the primary rightof-way, and eleven pumping plant sites
for the construction of a 48-inch diameter
oil pipeline system...The primary purpose
[to be] for the transportation of liquid
crude petroleum from the North Slope of
Alaska to a marine terminal at Port Valdez10

On that same day Undersecretary of Interior Russell Train
sent TAPS a list of seventy-nine questions on technical and

^Roscow,

800 Miles to V a l d e z , p. 32.

8Ibid.
8I b i d . , p. 32-33; see also Mary C. Berry, The Alaska
Pipeline, chapter three.
■^Hughs, George, letter to Bureau of Land Management,
Anchorage and Fairbanks, June 6, 1969.

21

environmental aspects of the project, designed, according
to Train,

"...to indicate the kind of questions to which

satisfactory answers will be required before permits can
be given for the use of public l a n d s . " H
In late June, Interior Secretary Hickel notified TAPS
that,
Permits would be granted as expeditiously
as possible, once Interior, the Congress,
and appropriate federal and state agencies
were satisfied that all legal, regulatory,
and environmental requirements had been met.-^
One interesting note is that at this time,

[summer of

196 9] Congress was working toward passing the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969.

As mentioned earlier,

this was to become a major tool for influencing public
policy in the late 1970's.

The relevant section of the NEPA

states that,
All agencies of the federal government shall
to the fullest extent possible, include in
every recommendation or report or proposal
for legislation and other major federal
actions significantly effecting the quality
of the human environment, a detailed state
ment on environmental impact...as well as
the alternatives which were considered.
That A u g u s t , .after securing permission from Congres
sional Interior Committees, Hickel gave his approval allowing
TAPS to build a fifty-five mile section of the haul road

•^Train, Undersecretary of Interior Russell E., letter
to R.E. Dulaney, June 10, 1969.
Quoted in Mary C. Berry,
The Alaska Pipeline, p. 106.
l^Roscow,

800 Miles to Valdez, p. 33.
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from Fairbanks to the south banks of the Yukon.

13

This

was to be the first permanent road which ever reached as
far north as the Yukon, but it still was not enough.

The

final road would have to be two hundred and sixty miles long
and eventually reach Prudhoe Bay.
During this same time the Department of Interior and
TAPS set out to remove the last remaining obstacles:

securing

final permission to build the pipeline and the road to
support it.

In August, hearings were begun before House and

Senate Interior Committees, working toward an early approval
which would allow construction to begin that winter.

It was

for the purpose of testifying at these hearings that the
environmental coalition first came into existence.
Composed principally of four groups— the Sierra Club,
Friends of the Earth,

the Environmental Defense Fund, and

the Wilderness Society--they testified before the House
and Senate,

although concentrating in the Senate probably

because of the perceived sympathetic views of Senator Henry
Jackson.

(D-WA)

the Earth,

14

David Brower,

founder of the Friends of

"testified to the Senate that the proposed

construction stipulations had loopholes you could float the
15
Manhattan through."

{Reference to the oil supertanker

which attempted unsuccessfully to make a journey through
the Northwest Passage in 1969, thereby eliminating the

13
14
15

Roscow,

800 Miles to Valdez, p. 33.

Cooper, Alaska - The Last Frontier, p. 223.
Roscow,

800 Miles to V a l d e z , p. 34.

possibility of loading the crude oil directly onto super
tankers from Prudhoe Bay.]
Next, on September 19, the Native Alaskan villages
which claimed land over the proposed pipeline route signed
over their claims to the r i g h t - o f - w a y , ^ in return for
concessions from TAPS.

Then on September 30, the Interior

Department published a set of stipulations regarding con
struction of the pipeline.

According to Mary C. Berry,

The thirty-four pages of stipulations
were touted as the most rigid controls
ever imposed upon a private construction
project by the government.
In fact, the
burden of applying them rested largely
upon the Bureau of Land Management
personnel in the field, who would be
working alongside the construction
crews, supervising the project.
The
idea was that these supervisors would
make sure TAPS and its contractors
obeyed the stipulations, and would
close down construction if they did
not, or when a question arose which
could not be answered in the field.
Finally, on October 1, Secretary Hickel asked Congress

to approve the entire project.
of deliberation,

After more than two months

in which many environmental issues were

raised, the House and Senate Interior Committees notified
Secretary Hickel on December 11 that they would now allow
permits to be issued.
However, Senator Jackson made it clear
that his committee was worried about the
environmental effects of the pipeline.

16
Mary C. Berry, The Alaska Pipeline
Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 110.
17Ibid., p. 111.

(Bloomington, Ind.

2.4
He also let the Secretary know that the
committee had considered, and rejected,
the option of evaluating the pipeline
itself.
It took expertise the committee
did not have.
Senator Jackson concluded
his letter with a mention of the NEPA,
then agreed upon in its final form by a
Senate-House conference committee and
about to be submitted to both houses
for a last v o t e . 18
Secretary Hickel did not immediately issue the permits,
even though he now clearly had the authority.

His intent

was to first issue a permit allowing construction of the
haul road, and issue later permits as they became necessary.
In January of 19 70, TAPS issued letters of intent to
construction companies from the Yukon to Prudhoe

B a y . 1 9

A short time later, these companies, anticipating firm
contracts, began moving their equipment from Fairbanks up
the partially re-opened Hickel Highway to convenient staging
points along the haul road's tentative route.^0

Secretary

Hickel was at the point of issuing the necessary permit
when a two-fold crisis arose and effectively stopped any
further activity.
First the Alaskan Natives acted.

As was mentioned

earlier, the natives with land claims along the proposed
route of the pipeline had signed waivers to allow the pipe
line to pass through their property.

Now they claimed that

an assurance of jobs promised to them by TAPS was not being

l^Berry, The Alaska Pipeline, p. 115.
19Ibid., p. 116.
20Ibid.

25
honored.

On March 9, 1970, five village associations filed

suit in Federal District Court in Washington D.C., seeking
to prevent Secretary Hickel from granting any permits for
construction on the claimed land.

Judge George L. Hart

agreed and issued a temporary restraining order.

21

Next, the environmental coalition took legal action.
The Center for Law and Social Policy, on behalf of its
clients— -the Wilderness Society, the Environmental Defense
Fund, and the Friends of the Earth--filed a complaint for
"Declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary
of the Interior."

22

They claimed that the permit Hickel

intended to issue would violate the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920, which restricted rights-of-way to fifty feet; twentyfive feet on each side of whatever was being built.

(TAPS'

June 6, 196 9 application was for a right-of-way of one hundred
feet.)

On April 6, the coalition amended their suit to

charge that the project also failed to comply with the impact
statement requirement of the NEPA.
The coalition was represented by James W. Moorman,
who left the Justice Department's Land and Natural Resources
Division the previous summer to join the new Center for
Law and Social Policy.

21
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Berry, The Alaska Pipeline, p. 118.
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Lynton K. Caldwell, Lynton R. Hayes and Isabel
MacWhirter, Citizens and the Environment (Bloomington,
Indiana University Press, 1976), p. 66.
23

Ind.:

Richard Corrigan "Settlement of Native Land Claims
Could Affect Alaska Pipeline Controversy," National Journal 3
(April 17, 1971); p. 84.
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On April 13, Judge Hart heard the case in Washington
D.C. District Court.

After listening to arguments from

Moorman, TAPS lawyers, and a Justice Department Lawyer
named Herbert Pittle, Judge Hart asked Moorman what relief
he sought:
The lawyer [Moorman] replied that since
the Interior Department was about to
give its permission for the road to be
built, his clients would like a prelimi
nary injunction until the case could be
tried on its merits, and two weeks
notice of the D e p a r t m e n t s intent to
issue the permit.
"Fair enough," said
the J u d g e . 2 4
When Pittle protested, Judge Hart replied,
pipeline are all one thing.

"The road and

The method you propose would

violate the Environmental Policy Act and the Mineral Leasing
Act.

You can't violate the law just by spending a billion

dollars to do it."25

judge Hart therefore issued an injunc

tion preventing the construction of the pipeline.

On April

14, he issued a second injunction against the haul road.

26

Thus, in less than two months of legal maneuvers the Alaskan
pipeline and the road needed to build it had been completely
stopped.
The first action TAPS took was to reorganize.

In August

of 197 0 TAPS became the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company.
Alyeska's first goal was to settle the Native Alaskan claims.
Until that was done, permit applications could not be con-

^ B e r r y , The Alaska Pipeline, p. 120.
25I b i d . , p. 120-121.
^Roscow,

800 Miles to Valdez, p. 61.
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sidered.
Resolving the Native land claims proved to be a

complicated process, with Alyeska and the Alaska Federation
of Natives

(AFN) cooperating much of the way.

Working at

various times with the Vice-President's Council of Indian
Opportunity, the Assistant Secretary of Interior for Public
Land Management, the Office of Management and Budget, and
a variety of aids and administrative assistants, they were
able to formulate an administrative bill which satisfied
most of the Natives' claims.

Among other things, the bill

included $500 million in royalities and over 40 million acres
of land; mostly contiguous to their villages.

27

On December 13, 1971, after an equally arduous time in
Congress, a Senate-House conference committee compromised
on a bill that was generally acceptable to everyone.

Called

"The Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971," it gave
the Natives the right to select 44 million acres of land.
For relinquishing any future claims they were to receive $4 6 2
million over an eleven year period, plus a two percent
royality payment until they had been paid an additional $500
million.

The ANCSA was signed into law by President Nixon on
oo
December 18, 1971.
Passage of the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act
was a major step toward the approval of the pipeline, and
ended the controversy over state land ownership for the time

27

Berry, The Alaska Pipeline, p. 160.
seven and eight.
28Ibid., p. 214.

See also chapters

28
being.

However, the environmental lawsuits and other

federal injunctions still remained, and the Interior
Department1s environmental impact statement was not
yet complete.
In the meantime,

the State of Alaska and the Alyeska

Pipeline Service Company were allowed to intervene in
the Wilderness Society vs. Hickel,
line.

29

in support of the pipe-

Alyeska's position was clear.

The state, on the

other hand, was concerned with the revenues which would
be raised after the pipeline was approved.

Appearing before

an Interior Department hearing, Governor William A.. Egan,
after outlining the state's plans to protect the environ
ment,

said:
Without the money gained from development
of our natural resources, we cannot pay
for schools to educate people, we cannot
pay for medical programs to keep them
healthy, we cannot remedy any of the sources,
and we cannot eliminate any of the human
miseries of which Alaska has had more than
its share of for so long.*^
On the other side, the Honorable David Anderson,

British Colombian member of Canada's House of Commons,,
received permission to intervene in opposition, as did
the one hundred and fifty thousand member Canadian Wild
life Federation.

They opposed the pipeline because it

necessitated coastal tanker routes, which threatened oil

29
30

Caldwell, Citizens and the Environment, p. 234.
Corrigan,

"Settlement of Native Land Claims," p. 83.

spills along the Canadian coast.

31

On March 20, 1972, the Interior Department issued the
final version of its environmental impact statement.

It was

nine volumes long— six which dealt with the environmental
impacts and three which were concerned with the economics
of the project.

32

The final decision on the construction

permit was to come in forty-five days, a waiting period
designed to allow comments on the impact statement.
The coalition members were wary.

They urged the

President to ask Secretary Morton to hold public hearings
on the subject.

But

(Morton) had indicated that he saw no

reason for more public hearings, and Judge Hart refused to
order them.

33

Undersecretary of Interior Pecora announced

that any further hearings would be a "circus," adding
that it would interfere with more thoughtful and rational
analysis of this complex d o c u m e n t . ^
Instead, the coalition put together its own environ
mental impact report and presented it to Secretary Morton
on May 4.

In this new impact statement, the issue of what

would be called 'The Canadian Alternative,' was first raised
This was a completely different route for the pipeline,
taking the oil from Prudhoe Bay, east into Canada through
the Canadian Northwest Territories, gathering any oil in

31
32

Caldwell, Citizens and the Environment, p. 234.
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Caldwell, Citizens and the Environment, p. 237.
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production there.

The pipeline would then run southeast into

Alberta, where it would connect with existing pipeline systems.
From here the oil would be sent two ways— to Puget Sound on
the-west coast, and also eastward to midwest markets.

James

Roscow summarizes the environmental arguments in favor of
this alternative:
A combined Alaska-Canada route would establish
a route that could be used later for a second
pipeline to bring natural gas from Prudhoe
Bay, south to the same markets.
The route
would cross more hospitable country in Canada
than in Alaska, and it would eliminate the
need for a tanker port on the sensitive
fishing waters of the Gulf of Alaska, and
for the constant tanker voyages up and down
the Alaska and Canadian w a t e r s . ^
Charles J. Cicchetti,

in his book Alaska O i l : Alternative

Routes and M a r kets, did a thorough and exhaustive cost-benefit
analysis on the economic aspects of a Canadian pipeline
vs. an Alaskan pipeline.

He concluded in favor of the Canadian

alternative:
The economic analysis reveals that the TransCanada pipeline alternatives are very likely
to be superior from the standpoint of net
benefits (cost-benefit ratios) and even tax
revenue for A l a s k a . 36
In addition to the discussion of the Canadian alternative,
the coalition criticized the Interior Department's nine
volume report,

^Roscow,

calling it a, "Passive document that blandly

800 Miles to Vald e z , p. 180.

^ C h a r l e s J. Cicchetti, Alaskan O i l : Alternative
Routes and Markets (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1972), p. 57.
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accepts at face value the fundamental premises of the oil
companies.Basically

these premises were that a

Canadian pipeline would be too expensive to build, would
take considerably longer to complete

(Canada had its own

unresolved native land claims), and that in a time of
crisis it was unwise to be dependent on any foreign power
for supplies of our own oil, no matter how friendly they
were.
On May 11, 1972,

(one week after the forty-five day

waiting period had expired), the new Secretary of Interior,
Rodgers C. Morton, announced that he had decided to approve
the rights-of-way for the

p i p e l i n e .

he compared the two alternatives.

^8

In his announcement

A pipeline through

Canada would damage a greater amount of tundra and perma
frost,

and although a pipeline through Alaska would risk

earthquake and tanker accidents, Morton,
protected against."3 9

"Felt these were

He also mentioned that a Canadian

line would take three to four years longer to complete.
After the announcement was made the only remaining
obstacles were the injunctions instituted by Judge Hart.
On August 15 he lifted these, claiming that the Interior
Department had met all the legal requirements for the
permit.40

"The final decision may rest with the Supreme

3 ^ B e r r y ,

^Roscow,

The Alaska Pipeline, p. 149.
800 Miles to V a ldez, p. 31.

39lbid.
^Berry,

The Alaska Pipeline, p. 354.
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Court,"

the Judge added.

by some Canadian groups,

The coalition members, now joined
immediately appealed the decision

to the District of Columbia Appellate Court.

On February 9,

1973, the court issued a decision which partially overturned
Judge Hart's r u l i n g . ^

The court did not rule whether

the project conformed to the NEPA, but instead claimed that
they had no jurisdiction over the rights-of-way limits in
the Mineral Leasing Act.

Congress had created the Act, and

only Congress could change it to allow a right-of-way greater
than fifty feet.

This decision was appealed to the Supreme

Court by the supporters of the pipeline, but it declined
review.^

The ultimate resolution of the pipeline issue

now had to be determined by Congress.

"

Within a few weeks, work began in Congress.
came out of both the House and Senate.

Bills

Congress first

decided to let the fifty foot limit stand, but amended it
to allow the Secretary of Interior the power to increase
a pipeline right-of-way during construction.
Although this resolved the difficulty surrounding
the Mineral Leasing Act, tougher questions remained about
the environment and the NEPA.

By April 1973, the energy

crisis was becoming noticable in some parts of the county.
This was especially true in the midwest, where fuel short
ages had closed some schools the previous winter, and were

4 J - R o s c o w ,

42ibid.

800 Miles to V a l d e z , p. 87.

threatening fall h a r v e s t s . ^

Some midwestern Congressmen

began working to have a pipeline go through Canada and into
their own districts.
The latter allied themselves with the conser
vationists, who realized that energy needs
made the development of the North Slope
reserves inevitable and had decided to back
the Canadian route as the lesser of two evils.

A

In late June the Senate Interior Committee reported a
bill to the full Senate which would authorize the pipeline
and give the Secretary discretion over the size of the right
of - w a y :
Regardless of whether the 19 69 decision
of the owner companies in favor of the
all-Alaska route was the wisest or the
most consistent with the national interest
at that time, and regardless of whether
the Administration's early commitment in
favor of that route was made on the basis
of adequate information and analysis,
the Committee determined that the TransAlaska pipeline is now clearly preferable,
because it could be on stream two to six
years earlier than a comparable overland
pipeline accross Canada.
(The emphasis is the Committee's.)
In regard to the request for additional studies of the
Canadian route, the report stated,

"It is doubtful...

whether further study could contribute to the accuracy
of such s p e c u l a t i o n s . " ^
There were to be two major amendments offered to

4^Berry, The Alaska Pipeline, p. 26.
44Ibid.
45Ibid., p. 163.
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this bill

(S-1081) on the floor.

The first was a proposal

by Alaskan Senator Mike Gravel to exempt the pipeline
from any further actions under the NEPA.

It seems that those

Congressmen and lobbyists favoring the pipeline believed
that just passing a bill authorizing its construction would
not be enough to clear away all the pending lawsuits.
solution was an exemption.

Their

An August 8, 1973 article in

the National Journal quotes one of Gravel's staff assistants
as saying,

"The Senator faced almost unanimous opposition

when he started pushing his amendment.

All the state officials

47
and the oil companies thought it was a mistake."

(Their

attitudes were to change shortly.)
The other amendment, posed by Senators Walter Mondale,
(D-Minn.)

and Birch Bayh,

(D-ind.), would have removed the

authority of the Pipeline from the Interior Department:
The Mondale-Bayh amendment authorized a
National Academy of Sciences study of
alternative routes, to be followed by
a Congressional determination of which
was preferable.
The State Department
was directed to start discussions
immediately with the Canadians about
a trans-Canada pipeline.
This amendment was supported by the environmental coalition
as a type of "last ditch" effort against the pipeline.
On Friday, July 13, the Senate defeated the Mondale-

47

Richard Corrigan and Claude Barfield, "Pipeline Lobby
Uses Its Political Muscle to Bypass Environmental Law,"
National Journal 5 (August 11, 1973); 1175.
48

Berry, The Alaska Pipeline, p. 269.
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Bayh amendment by a vote of 61 to 29.
Senate voted on the NEPA exclusion.
tie.

49

On July 17, the

The vote was a 49 - 49

Vice-President Agnew, by tradition,

vote, which was in favor of the amendment.

cast the tie-breaking

Following the

NEPA vote the Senate passed the bill 77 to 20.

50

While this was occuring in the Senate, the House was
working on a similar measure.

After a series of close votes,

the House Interior Committee approved language exempting
the pipeline from the NEPA by a 19 to 17 vote.

51

Surprisingly,

the House floor debate went smoothly, due in part to heavy
lobbying by the oil companies and Alyeska.
August 21, was 3 56 to 60.
said,

52

One angry midwestern legislator

"It was a shameful afternoon.

of oil.

The vote, on

The whole House stank

There hasn't been anything like this since the days

when the railroads bought legislators."

53

By the time the summer recess was over and the HouseSenate conference committee met to resolve the differences
between the two bills, war had broken out in the Middle
East, and OPEC had declared an embargo on all oil shipments
to the United States.
to act quickly.

49

The conference committee was forced

The House of Representatives passed the

Berry, The Alaska Pipeline, p. 270.
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"Pipeline Lobby Uses Its
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"Pipeline Lobby Uses Its

Trans-Alaskan Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973 on November
12, by a vote of 361 to 14.
it by a margin of 80 to 5.

The next day the Senate passed
President Nixon sighed the bill

into law on November 16, 19 73.
Five years after the initial discovery of the huge oil
deposit, a pipeline to transport the oil had finally been
authorized.

Work began in early 1974, and on July 20, 1977,

oil began flowing through the pipeline.
producing 1.9 million barrels a day.

By 1980, it was

CHAPTER THREE

. The Alaskan lands controversy was a significant environ
mental issue for many of the same reasons that distinguished
the Alaskan pipeline issue.

Again, a vast amount of

ecologically fragile land was at stake, and once more the
lines were clearly drawn between developer and conservationist
the former seeking maximum exploitation of the s t a t e ’s
resources,

and the latter fighting for increased federal

protection of all wilderness areas involved.

An Interior

Department specialist on Alaskan affairs said part of the
controversy could be stated simply,

"Very high scenic

value, very high mineral value— classic war."l
In order to understand the background of this issue
it is necessary to recall the Native Alaskan Claims Settlement
Act of 1971.

(See chapter two)

settlement is section 17

(d)

A key provision of this

(2), which states in part that

the Secretary of Interior:
Is directed to withdraw from all forms of
appropriation under the public land laws,
including the mining and mineral leasing laws
and from selections under the Alaska Statehood
Act, and from selection by Regional Corporations
(the Natives) ... up to, but not to exceed,
eighty million acres of unreserved public
lands in the State of Alaska, including
previously classified lands, which the
Secretary deems are suitable for addition
to or creation as units of the National
Park, Forest, Wildlife, Refuge, and Wild

Ijames R. Wagner, "The Alaska Lands Issue: Our Last
Frontier," Congressional Quarterly 35 (July 30, 1977):
p. 1587.
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and Scenic River Systems.
Under Section

(d)

2

(2) and a previous subsection,

120 million acres were withdrawn.

(d)

(1),

The Act also directed

t h e .Secretary to recommend to Congress within two years
how these lands should be designated.

Within five years

of the Secretary's designations, Congress was to establish
3
the areas officially and set their boundaries.
If
legislation was not passed by December 18, 197 8, all
protection for these lands would come to an end.
In December 1973 Rodgers C. Morton recommended
establishing 83 million acres of Alaska,

in 23 areas, as

additions to the four systems of protection.

(National

Parks, National Wildlife Refuges, National Forests, and
4
National Wild and Scenic Rivers.)
No immediate action was
taken on his recommendations.

Between 1973 and 1976 several

bills were introduced concerning the withdrawn land, but
none of them ever reached the hearing stage.
Nineteen seventy-seven, however, proved to be an impor
tant year for this issue.

With the deadline approaching,

several pieces of legislation were introduced.

Among them

was H.R.

(D-AZ)

39, sponsored by Rep. Morris K. Udall.

bill was supported by the Alaska Coalition,

2

This

the seventeen

U.S., Congress, Senate, Conference Report on Alaska Native
Claims Settlement A c t , S . Report 92-581, 92nd. Congress,
1st. session, 1971, Senate Miscellaneous Reports on
Public Bills, 1:25.
3
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national and Alaskan conservation groups working on the
issue, because it was the most restrictive of development.
Described as an ambitious plan,

it encompassed 115 million

acres, which were to be placed under the protection of the
traditional four systems.

Additionally,

all the areas were

to be -esignated as wilderness, making them components of
the National Wilderness Preservation System.

Wilderness

classification amounts to an overlay on the other Systems,
and restricts logging, mining,
gas.

5

and extraction of oil and

Similar legislation was introduced in the Senate by

Henry Jackson,

(D-WA), as S-50 0.

This was later modified

and reintroduced by the late Lee Metcalf,

(D-MT), as S-1500

and included about one million additional acres.
Contraposed to this was S-178 7, introduced by Alaskan
Senator Ted Steyens on June 30, 1977.

This bill, drafted

by Stevens, Alaskan Representative Don Young, and Alaskan
Governor Jay Hammond, was supported by the State and interested
pro-development corporations.

It would have added less than

25 million acres to the four systems, with none classified
as wilderness.
into a new
Lands."

It would also have placed 57 million acres

(fifth) category, called "Federal Cooperative

These lands would be managed by e xisting.federal

agencies, but in conjunction with lands managed by state
and private landowners.

All these lands would still be open

5
Ann Pelham, "Meeds Loses m Test Vote on His Alaska
Lands Plan," Congressional Quarterly 36 (January 21, 1978):
p. 127.
/■
Wagner, "The Alaskan Lands Issue," p. 1589.

to development.
Conservationists immediately voiced the concern about
the so-called "fifth category."

But Stevens saw it as a

way to postpone decisions about what to do with at least
some of the disputed lands.

"I know of no other state

where we have had such a wholesale attack on its lands,"
Stevens said at a press conference on June 30th.

"We

would have been better off with seperate bills for each
parcel of land."7
Standing somewhere between these two plans was the
Carter Administration proposal.

Presented on September 15,

it took the form of amendments to H.R.

39.

The Administration

recommended protection for 91.7 5 million acres, approximately
twenty percent less than called for by H.R.
much less land to be designated wilderness.
plan,

39, and directed
Calling the

"the highest environmental priority of the Administration

Secretary Cecil D. Andrus said,

"If we err in this decision

and exclude some previous and delicate areas from the four
systems, these areas are lost forever... But if we err by
conserving too much, this can always be changed in the future."

In general, conservation groups were pleased with the
proposal.

Cathy Smith, The Alaska Coalition's Washington

coordinator said of the Administration's plans,

"We are

^"The Alaskan Lands Issue: Our Last Frontier,"
1977 Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Washington D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1977), p. 673.
8James R. Wagner, "Administration Submits Proposals
to Protect Alaskan Wilderness," Congressional Quarterly 35
(September 24, 1977): p. 2003.
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in total agreement with them on so many issues that they
have outlined."

9

The only exception was the lack of move

ment towards wilderness protection.

They objected to the

fact that the Alaska Peninsula and the lower Naotak River
were excluded from (d)

(2) protection.

The House of Representatives was the first to act.

A

special subcommittee of the Interior and Insular Affairs
Committee,

called the Subcommittee on General Oversight and

Alaska Lands, was established to work on legislation.
subcommittee began hearings during April 1977,
D.C.

in Washington

They then moved on to Chicago, Denver, Atlanta,

Seattle.
Alaska.

The

and

During July and August hearings were held in
In total,

seventeen formal hearings and twenty-two

meetings were held, with over two thousand witnesses
testifying.^
On October 17, the subcommittee, under its chairman
John Seiberling,

(D-Ohio)

began mark-up of. the bill.

The

subcommittee staff ordered an- unnumbered draft substitute
bill as a possible vehicle for mark-up.
draft had his,

Udall said the

"approval as a new starting point."

12

On

November 3, the subcommittee voted to accept the now twice
revised version of H.R.

39 as the mark-up vehicle.

The

total acreage to be protected now stood at 102 million,

9
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81 million of which was to be designated as wilderness.
However,

further consideration was put off until early 1978

after Representative Lloyd Meeds,
for.additional time so,

(D-WA) asked Seiberling

"he could study the proposals and

possibly write a new one."

13

On January 16, 197 8 Meeds made his plan public.

He

proposed to put only 7 9 million acres into the four systems,
with only 10 million acres classified as wilderness.
Additionally,
Meeds proposed (his own) "fifth system"
of 18.5 million additional acres called
Alaska Natural Wildlands, which would
receive further study by government and
private interests to identify mineral,
oil and other resources.
They are,
"lands we don't know enough about,"
that would be protected while studies
continue, he said.
One Udall aide called Meeds' action,

"divisive as hell,"

15

because it was likely to destroy Democratic harmony on the
issue.

Both the Carter Administration and conservation

groups opposed the Meed amendment, or any other type of
postponment.

"Developers love delay,"

of the National Audubon Society.

said Steve Young

"They can lobby indefinitely,

chipping away at their opponents, while conservation groups
with limited resources must concentrate their efforts."

16

On January 18, 1978 the subcommittee voted on whether

13

Ann Pelham, "New Proposal Muddies Alaska Lands Debate,"
Congressional Quarterly 36 (January 14, 1978): p. 66.
14
15

Pelham,

"Meeds Loses m

Test Vote," p. 12.

Pelham,

"New Proposal Muddies Alaska Lands Debate," p. 66.
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to use Meeds'

substitute as the vehicle for mark-up,

to stay with H.R. 39.

The vote was 10 to 7 for H.R.

in favor of the conservationist position.

17

or
39,

This would

prove to be a very significant vote for conservationists
because it meant that their opponents had to put their
alternative proposals up as amendments to H.R.

the rest of the subcommittee mark-up.

39 during

"The pro-development

forces were required to assemble a majority on every amendment they proposed."

18

When asked why he involved himself so heavily in the
debate and spent weeks working on his proposa l, Meeds,
(who planned to retire at the end of the year)

replied,

"That's a good question...! felt that Cthe committee) was
unduly restricting the State of Alaska and its development,
and unduly restricting the Natives and also development of
other resource values."

19

Even after defeat, however, Meeds

vowed to carry his fight to the House floor.
H.R. 3 9 was subjected to fourteen days of mark-up during
January and February.

On February 7, the bill was reported

to the full Interior Committee.

The total amount of land

to be protected now stood at 9 8 million acres,

although no

decision was reached on how much would be designated wilder
ness.

The subcommittee prefered to let that decision be

17

Pelham,

"Meeds Loses in Test Vote," p. 127.

18

Donald J. Patterson, "Environmental Groups and The
Alaska (D) (_2) Lands,"
(Senior Honors Thesis, College of
William and Mary, 1979), p. 18.
19

Pelham,

"Meeds Loses m

Test Vote," p. 127.

made by the entire committee.
As promised, Meeds tried to substitute his bill for the
one reported by the subcommittee.

The 20 to 24 vote against

Meeds was another crucial victory for conservationists.
Lobbyists for oil and gas interests, mining companies,

and

labor groups had rallied behind the proposal; a lobbying
combination that even the Carter Administration found
difficult to c o u n t e r . ^

At one point in the debate Interior

Chairman Udall sought to clear up an argument used by Meed's
supporters that logging jobs would be lost if large areas
were designated as wilderness:
"A lot of my friends are being misled,"
Udall told the Committee.
"They're
being lobbied by timber companies,
'
lobbied by labor unions...I don't
want to see them join the wrecking
crew on this.
The people who don't
want this bill are using the labor
unions to act as abattering ram for
them."21
The Interior
a 32 to 13 vote.

Committee reported the bill
However, this required

March

21 by

the sacrifice

of the

2.4 million acre Misty Fjords area in the Tongass National
Forest,

excluding it from the proposed wilderness designation.

Thus mining,

logging, and oil and gas exploration would no

longer be barred from that area.

"These deletions will

assure that not a timber-related job will be lost in south
eastern Alaska as a result of this legislation," said
2n

Ann Pelham, "Conservationists Win Alaska Wilderness
Key Vote," Congressional Quarterly 36 (March 11, 1978): p. 616
2-1-Ibid.

22ibid.

45
committee member Bob Echart,
of the bill was intact.

(D-TX)^3

still, the substance

"In most of the critical areas we

have held strong," said Cathy Smith, of the Alaska Coalition.24
. After passing through the Merchant Marine Committee,
where proposed amendments to the provisions on wildlife
refuges were added,

it was up to the House Rules Committee

to grant a rule before H.R. 3 9 could reach the floor.
Meeds, who was also a member of the Rules Committee, tried
to prevent a floor vote because,

"It would be unwarranted

to make House members vote on a tough labor versus conser
vation issue when there is absolutely no chance, at this
time, of it going to the Senate

F l o o r .

"25

The Rules

Committee disagreed, however, and granted an open rule
on May 16, after two weeks of debate and delay.
There were five key votes on H.R.

39 after it reached

the House floor, all of which were won by the conservationists
and their supporters.

This included an amendment by Young

to delete. 4.5 million acres of area from proposed parks
and refuges,

(defeated 251-141),

and an amendment sponsored

by Meeds to cut in half the amount of acerage designated
wilderness,

(defeated 240-119).

The only victory for the

pro-development side was an amendment by Jim Santini,

(D-Nev.)

which instructed the Secretary Of Interior to continue

23peiham, "Conservationists Win Alaska Wilderness
Key VotO," p. 616.
(D)

^ P a t t e r s o n , "Environmental Groups and the Alaska
(2) Lands," p. 18.

25^nn Pelham, "Alaska Wilderness Bill Heads for House
Floor," Congressional Quarterly 36 (May 6, 1978) p. 1125.

46
mineral assessments on all public lands in Alaska and required
the President to submit to Congress by October 1, 1981,
recommendations regarding mineral development on these lands,
(passed 157-150).

The final vote on H.R. 39 was 277 to 31,
2g
a ratio of almost nine-to-one in favor of the bill.
The Senate undertook consideration of the Alaska lands
issue on June 6.
many delays.

It was a difficult procedure, hampered by

The problem was two-fold.

At this time there

was a considerable amount of pending legislation to which
the Democratic leadership had given a higher priority than
the Alaska lands bill.

(Especially important was the issue

of natural gas deregulation which was before Senator Henry
Jackson's Energy and Natural Resources Committee, the same
committee which would deal with the lands issue.)

27

Additionally, Alaska's two Senators, Mike Gravel and
Ted Stevens, were both opposed to the conservationists,
or any type of environmentally strict legislation.

During

the week of July 10, Gravel invoked a little known rule which
forced the Senate committee to meet early in the morning,
with poor attendance the result and little work being accomplished.

28

(D-W. VA)

Later that week Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd.
invoked another obscure parliamentary rule which

26

(D)

Patterson, "Environmental Groups and the Alaska
(2) Lands," p. 19.
27

Ann Pelham, "Alaska Lands Bill Moving Slowly Through
Senate Panel," Congressional Quarterly 36 (July 22, 1978):
p. 1876-1877.
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allowed the Senate to bypass G r avel’s obstacle.

However

Gravel still threatened to filibuster the bill if it were
ever to reach the senate floor.
Although his threat to filibuster remained, Senator
Gravel did not employ any further overt delaying tactics the
rest of the year.

Contrary to this was Senator Stevens,

who also threatened a filibuster and did play a major delaying
role in the S e n a t e ’s consideration of the legislation.
was done for several reasons.

This

The longer the mark-up procedure

took, the more concessions he could achieve for the pro-develop
ment position.

Additionally,

if mark-up was not completed

until the end of the session there would be no time for a
House-Senate conference.

The House would be forced to choose

between the pro-development Senate bill or no bill at all.2^
To this end Stevens sat in on all Energy and Natural
Resources Committee mark-up sessions and won many concessions,
even though he was not a member of the committee.

Apparently

members of the committee gave into him more that they might
have otherwise in an attempt to get the bill passed and
avoid a filibuster.
With the end of the session approaching, the
threat of a filibuster became more effective.
It was felt by some that a one-man filibuster
by Gravel could be broken, and that if
Stevens (accepted) the Energy Committee's
bill, Congress could pass Alaska lands legis
lation that year.30

^ A n n Pelham, "Lengthly Mark-up Increases Odds Against
Enactment of Alaska Lands Bill," Congressional Quarterly
36 (September 9, 1978): p. 2440.
30
^Patterson,
L a n d s ," p. 20.

"Environmental Groups and The Alaska

(D)

(2)
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The concessions made to Stevens upset many conser
vationists.

Chuck Cluser of the Sierra Club stated that

the Alaska Coalition was very disappointed in what the
energy committee had done.

"We're not about to be black

mailed with a weak bill just because there isn't enough
time."

31

Morris Udall echoed this feeling when he said,

"There are a dozen things in there
that make it unacceptable."

(the Senate bill)

now

32

After weeks of compromising, and over forty mark-up
sessions, the committee reported the bill on October 5.
There were now numerous differences between the Senate and
House versions.

Stevens fought against anything that

resembled H.R. 39, while conservationists were represented
by Committee member John A. Durkin,

(D-N.H.).

Senator

Jackson, the chairman, generally took a position somewhat
between the t w o .
The same lobbyists for mineral, lumber,
oil and gas interests, and conservation
organizations, who had followed the House
bill through months of mark-up spent hours
in the energy committee hearing room,
waiting for meetings to begin and watching
the very slow p r o c e s s . ^

The strategy for the conservationists and other supporters
of H.R. 39 now was to have Udall and other House leaders
meet with Senate leaders and find a compromise on the issue

31
32
33

Pelham,

"Lengthly Mark-Up Increases Odds," p. 2440.

Ibid.

Ann Pelham, "Alaska Lands Bill Reported by Senate
Committee, But Action This Year Uncertain," Congressional
Quarterly 36 (October 7, 1978): p. 2768.

before the bill went to the Senate floor.

"Then the

compromise could be offered as an amendment to the Senate
committee bill.

If the compromise was accepted then it

could be returned to the House for quick action,"34 and
sent to the President for his signature.

These attempts

were done with little enthusiasm however,

as Senator Gravel

still claimed he would filibuster.

Also, Senator Byrd said

he would not bring the bill before the full Senate unless
there was a time limit on debate, which Gravel could also
prevent, because of the backlog of other bills which needed
consideration.35
The situation changed dramatically on October 12, when
Gravel said in a letter to Senators Stevens and Byrd that he
would no longer block the bill.

He claimed he changed his

mind because the Citizens for the Management of Alaskan
Lands

(the coalition of industry groups opposed to the bill)

The Alaska Lands Steering Council

(a group sponsored by the

Alaska state legislature), and other Alaskan politicians
had convinced him that,

"We should attempt compromise for

a bill this year.
According to a Congressional Quarterly article dated
October 21st, Gravel's announcement that he was dropping his
filibuster plans hit the negotiations,

34pelham,

"like a shot of

"Alaska Lands Bill Reported," p. 2767.

35ibid.
3^Ann Pelham, "Administration Expected to Move to
Preserve Alaska Wilderness Areas," Congressional Quarterly
36 (October 21, 1978): p. 3100.
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adrenalin."
Secretary of Interior Andrus cut short a
western trip.
Key House and Senate leaders
holed up with him in a room under the front
eves of the Capitol.
The band of committee
aides, Interior officials, lobbyists and
others who had followed the legislation for
more than a year and a half camped outside
the closed meeting.3 7

After a day and a half of closed meetings, lasting over
twenty hours, the conference members were close to reaching a
decision.

Congressional Quarterly reports that approximately

96 million acres would have been put into the four systems
with a total of 50 million acres of new and old four systems
land to be designated wilderness.

38

Yet toward the end of the session Gravel issued one
additional demand.

He insisted on a guarantee that specific

rights-of-way be assigned for pipelines, railroads, highways
and other types of transportation across federal conservation

areas and other state-owned lands.

Morris Udall and John

Seiberling, who had already agreed to many changes which

weakened the bill, could not accept this change.
broke up on October 14, at 11:00 am.
waiting outside,

"Its all over.

Stevens told those

No bill."

39

There was to

be no Alaska Lands bill from the 95th Congress.
day Senator John Durkin said,

37

Pelham,

The meeting

The next

"The compromise floundered on

"Administration Expected to Move," p. 3100.

38Laura B. Weiss, "Alaskans Seek Injunction to Stop
Carter Move to Protect Federal Lands," Congressional
Quarterly 36 (November 4, 1978): p. 3228.
39

Pelham,

"Administration Expected to Move," p. 3101.
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two words,

and those two words are,

'Mike Gravel.'"

The failure of Congress to reach a decision made
executive action necessary.

In July of that year Secretary

Andrus

had warned that the administration would take action

of its

own if Congress was unable.

sible sources of authority.)

(See table one

for

pos

On September 15, speaking

before the Nature Conservancy, he renewed this pledge:

On my recent float trip with President
Carter we discussed Alaska, and he made
it absolutely clear that he stands behind
whatever measures we must take to protect
those Alaskan wildlands... The stakes in
Alaska are too high for hesitation.
The loss to the nation would be too
great.
If the Congress f a i l s ’to a c t ^
this year, the President and I will.
On November 16, using the'Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976, he closed 110 million acres of land to commercial
development for a three year period.
On December 1, using the Antiquities Act of 1906,
President Carter gave the Alaska lands additional protection.

He created seventeen new national monuments, giving permanent
protection to 55 million acres of federal wilderness in the
state.

"Risks of immediate damage to magnificent areas make

it imperative to protect all the lands and preserve for

Congress an unhampered opportunity to act on its own in the

40
41

Pelham,

"Administration Expected to Move," p. 3100.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Secretary of Interior Andrus
as he addresses the Nature Conservancy, September 14, inserted
by Senator Stevens of Alaska, 95th Congress, Second Session,
September 18, 1978, Congressional Record, 124: S15287 15289.

Table 1
Possible Sources of Authority for Action
by Carter Administration

1. Federal Land Policy and Management Act— also known as the
Bureau of Land Management "organic act", this law set out general
policy for management of the more than 470 million acres of fede
ral land in the agency's jurisdiction.
Under this law, the Inter
ior Secretary could have earmarked for wilderness study millions
of federally owned acres in Alaska.
While being studied, this
land would have to be managed in a way that would not destroy
existing wilderness features.
Secretary of Interior Andrus used
this law to protect the (d) (2) land on November 16, 19 78.
2. Antiquities Act of 1906--this law gives the President
authority to use executive orders to create national monuments.
Such a designation gives them approximately the same protection
as is given to areas classified as national parks.
Precedent
exists for using this act to protect large areas of Alaska.
For instance, Glacier Bay, a wilderness sand beach along the
Pacific Coast, is a national monument as is Katmai, 2.7 million
acres in the southern part of the state.
President Carter used
the Antiquities Act to protect federal land in Alaska on Dec
ember 2, 19 78.
3. Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956--this act gave the Secretary
of the Interior authority to take steps needed to conserve and
develop fisheries and wildlife resources, including the estab
lishment of refuges for fish and wildlife.
To date, this has
not been utilized to protect any Alaskan land.

Source: Ann Pelham, "Alaska Lands Bill Moving Slowly Through
Senate Panel," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,
July 22, 1978, p. 1877.
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next year,"42 sai^ Carter.

A spokesman for the Alaska

Coalition said Carter had exceeded the efforts of even
Theodore Roosevelt and become,
President of all

"The greatest conservation

t i m e . " 4 ^

Activities of the 96th Congress paralleled those of
the 9 5th in many ways.

In the House of Representatives,

the

initial movement seemed to be against the conservationists.
The House Interior Committee, during mark-up on February 28,
1979, adopted a substitute bill in place of H.R.
a 23 to 20 vote.

Offered by Jerry Huckaby,

39 by

(D-LA) the sub

stitute was identical to the compromise bill killed in the
Senate a year before by Mike Gravel.

Udall attributed the

defeat to a change in the committee membership.

A Republican

delegate from the Virgin Islands took a seat held by a
Democrat in the previous session, and voted for the sub
stitute.

It set aside nearly 98 million acres in conservation

areas, and designated approximately 51 million acres as
wilderness.
Developers also won a vote in the Merchant Marine
Committee on April 9.

Although the committee voted on an

amendment by Representative Breaux,
million acres as conservation units,

(D-LA)

to set aside 127

85 million acres were

designated as refuge, a classification which permitted
commercial development.

42^nn Pelham, "Carter Sets Aside 56 Million Acres in
Alaska," Congressional Quarterly 36 ( December 2, 1978):
p. 3389.
43Ibid.
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"being stampeded by the oil and gas interests."
Carter as saying,

"This has made my day."

Andrus quoted

A

On the other side of capitol hill, the Senate Energy
Committee used S. 9, a bill identical to the one it reported
in 1978, as the basis of its 1979 proceedings.

Alaska's

senators Gravel and Stevens both played important roles in
the Senate's activities— Stevens as a member of the Energy
Committee and Gravel as a non-member,
by Chairman Henry Jackson.

invited to participate

Both were anxious to get a

pro-development bill reported that year.

The alternative

was to wait until 19 80, an election year,

in which they

felt it would be difficult to get senators to vote in their
favor.

Another key member of the committee was Paul Tsongas,

(D-Mass.) who represented the conservationists' position
throughout the deliberation.
The committee took steps to avoid the lengthly and
counterproductive mark-up fights which occurred in 1978.
Informal meetings were held between Gravel, Stevens, and
Tsongas, where many controversial issues were negotiated
and agreed upon.

The products of these sessions were then

brought to the full committee for formal ratification.

"An awful lot is happening behind the scenes to take un
acceptable amendments and make them acceptable," said
Rich Arenberg, a Tsongas aide, referring to the negotiations.47
The mark-up sessions took most of the month of October.

^ " H o u s e Passes Bill, But Senate Stymied," p. 665.
47Ibid., p. 672.
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Gravel, generally unsuccessful in getting his amendments
accepted by the committee, threatened again to filibuster
any bill he did not like.

Senator Stevens, however, was

anxious for a bill to be passed.
to do so in 1978,
economy."

He claimed that failure

"had a devastating effect on the state's

Investors stayed away because of uncertainty,

unemployment was up, and growth in per capita income
was less in Alaska than in the rest of the country.

Stevens

at first sought a time limit to restrict debate on the
bill, but abandoned his efforts when Gravel made clear his
intention to filibuster anything he considered a "bad bill."
The problem was resolved at the end of October after
many long mark-up sessions.

"A blue-ribbon advisory panel

of Alaska officials and residents appointed by Governor
Hammond decided the Senate bill was livable, and urged the
48
two warring Senators to work together for its passage."
The panel decided that the committee bill,
even though it doesn't contain what they
want, is the high water-mark on what they
can expect on Alaska lands legislation
this year, said Bob Miller, a spokesman
^
from the Alaska state office in Washington.
Additionally,

the panel advised the two Senators to try and

kill the bill of any significant changes

(pro-environment)

were made on the floor or during the conference.
The committee, by a vote of 17 to 1, ordered reported
its version of H.R.

48
49

39

(S9) on October 30.

It set aside

"House Passes Bill, But Senate Stymied," p. 677.
Ibid., p. 674.
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102 million acres of land,
designated wilderness.

39.2 million of .which were to be

Gravel agreed not to filibuster

and Stevens began working for a time agreement on floor
action.

However, all progress stopped on November 15, after

Tsongas introduced a substitute bill which would have set
aside 125 million acres with over 80 million of them desig
nated wilderness.

Emergency negotiations between Tsongas

and Stevens failed.

Stevens broke off his attempts to bring

the bill up for immediate consideration for fear that the
full Senate would accept the substitute once it was on the
floor.

This would leave the pro-development forces with

little to negotiate in a House-Senate conference.

Stevens'

withdrawal ended the chance of passing an Alaskan lands bill
during the first session of the 96th Congress.
On February 7, 1980, the pro-development forces
scored a victory when Senators Stevens and Gravel were
able to get the Senate to agree by voice vote to delay floor
action on the Alaskan lands legislation until after the
July 4th recess.

The agreement provided for twenty hours of

debate and the introduction of a total of fourteen amendments;
this in exchange for Gravel's agreement not to filibuster.
At a press conference after the vote, the two senators
displayed their enthusiasm.
entered into the agreement,

They said that if they had not
the bill would have come up

right after the February 11-15 recess.

"We wouldn't have

been able to stop it (if it had been called up) now," Gravel
said.

He continued,

"Never in my wildest dreams did I think

we could hold out until late summer or fall."

Stevens agreed,

57
"I thought the longest we could hold out was May."

50

The Senators now believed that they could force more com
promises from the environmentalists by waiting until
close to the end of the session when most Senators would
be pressed for time.
Environmentalists and the administration were generally
caught off guard by the agreement.
of the Alaska Coalition,

Charles Clusen, chairman

complained that the action was,

"reminiscent of the efforts made by the Alaskan Senators in
1978 to force debate of the issue into the final closing
hours of the session."

51

Secretary Andrus reacted on February 11 by shifting
the momentum back to the conservationists.

He withdrew an

additional 4 0 million acres of land from development, bringing
the total to 96 million acres that had been put off limits
to developers for at least twenty years.

The remaining 14

million acres of the original 110 million which Carter w i t h 
drew in 1978 were put under review, keeping alive the possibility
that they could eventually be withdrawn also.

Andrus pointed

out that the withdrawals could be rescinded by passage of an
Alaskan lands bill, and that his actions were designed as a
type of insurance policy to prevent the type of,

"deliberate

obstructionism," which killed a similar bill in 1978.

"The

Senators are of the position that there will not be any
bill this year.

That is exactly why I decided to take the

50

Kathy Koch, "Alaska Lands Development Leave No Clear
Winners," Congressional Quarterly 38 (February 16, 1980): p. 396.
^ I b i d . , p. 397.
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withdrawal action."

52

It was early August before the Senate began deliberation
anew.

The Senate Energy Committee worked for two weeks in

closed-door sessions developing its less restrictive version
of H.R.

39.

On August 19, the full Senate adopted a compromise

version of this bill by a vote of 7 8 to 14.

53

The measure

set aside only 104.3 million acres of land into the different
conservation units,
on oil, mineral,

and imposed various degrees of restrictions

and timber development.

It passed despite

the strong objections of Senator Gravel, who was to lose his
bid for re-election later that m o n t h . r It also completed the

transfer of lands mandated by the Alaska Statehood Act and
delivered approximately 44 million acres of land due to the
native Indians under the Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971.
Senator Stevens commented that,

done.
after.

"It is the best that can be

It gives everyone eighty percent of what they were
54

Initial House reaction was skeptical, and conservation
leaders vowed to work and strengthen the Senate bill.

House

members wrote Udall demanding that the Senate versions be
brought more in line with the House bill.

The 19 80 elections,

however, played a part in changing many individuals'
Udall said,

52
53
1980;
54

Koch,

attitudes.

"Political realities now dictate that we act

"Alaska Lands Development," p. 397.

"Key Votes," Congressional Quarterly 38
p. 3663.

{.December 27,

"All We Wanted And Less," Los Angeles T i m e s , editorial,
(November 13, 1981); p. 8.
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promptly on the Senate passed bill.

We must accept the fact

that Reagan is with us for four y e a r s . F r o m
vationists' viewpoint,

this was a wisle decision.

the conser
The incoming

Republican majority in the Senate would most likely be more
sympathetic toward the pro-development position, and Ronald
Reagan had already stated his displeasure with the Senate
measure,

calling it too restrictive.

On November 12, the House therefore approved the bill,
with little debate, by a rather undramatic voice vote.

After

the vote Udall told Alaska Coalition members gathered outside
the House chambers that,
It is a beginning."56

"The first installment has been made.

Coalition members agreed but added that

they would fight for refinements in the future.
Seiberling commented that the measure,

Representative

"Represents about

eighty-five percent of what we had hoped to achieve when we
passed the House b i l l . 11^
President Carter announced that he was pleased,

and

called the decision a historic event in the nation's history.
He signed the measure into law on December 2, 1980.

Thus,

after years of contention and debate, twenty-eight percent
of the total land area in Alaska--encompassing wild rivers,
tundra, mountain ranges,

seacoasts,

forests, and wildlife

refuges— was guaranteed to be safe from development and

^ K a t h y Koch, "House Clears the Senate's Alaska Lands
Bill," Congressional Quarterly 38 (November 15, 1980): p. 3377.
56Ibid.
S^Ibid.t p. 337 8.
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exploration.

Ironically the threat of losing more under a

Republican administration forced environmentalists to accept
what properly should be regarded as a historic conservation
victory.

It was one of the largest and most intensely

lobbied battles in Congressional history.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Alaska Public Interest Cohlition, which fought
against the pipeline,

and the Alaska Coalition, which

worked for the Alaska lands bill, are both excellent
examples of "Public Interest" coalitions which actively
sought to influence public policy.

The failure of the

former when compared with the success of the latter
provides a unique way of evaluating the effectiveness of
certain strategies and tactics of influence.

The purpose

of this chapter, then, will be to compare the two coalitions
both the circumstances surrounding their formation and their
organizational structure,

and the various strategies and

tactics of influence they employed.
From its inception, billed by its sponsors as the most
expensive construction project ever undertaken by private
industry, the trans-Alaskan pipeline symbolized the con
flict between land development and preservation of natural
resources.

Tom Brown, working with the Sierra Club in 19 70,

stated that,
Never before have conservationists had a
better opportunity to rescue nature from
the mindless onslaught of technology.
Nor
could the battleground be more crucial
than Alaska...If the nation's conserva
tionists have the staying power, they
stand a better chance of keeping Alaska
from repeating the folly of the rest of
the nation.1

^Tom Brown, Oil On Ice
p. 130-131.

(San Francisco: The Sierra Club)
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The "staying power" of the environmentalist movement
in this instance took the form of the Alaska Public
Interest Coalition.

This organization,

affiliated environmental groups,

composed of loosely

facilitated cooperation

between all those who opposed the construction of the
Alaska pipeline.
By far the most important organizations in the coalition
were the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, the Friends of
the Earth, and the Center for Law and Social Policy,

(a law

firm which represented the coalition's interests in court),
the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs, the Izaak Walton
League of America, Trout Unlimited of Denver Colorado,

Zero

Population Growth of Los Angeles, and the American Rivers
Council.^
The Alaskan lands issue symbolized much of the same type
of controversy.

Conservationists, development interests,

Carter Administration officials, members of Congress, Alaskan
officials,

and lobbyists for diverse organizations all

highlight the importance of the issue.

This time the environ

mentalist movement was represented by the Alaska Coalition,
an organization of national and Alaskan groups.

"I think

there is a real feeling that this is a most important highpriority issue for all conservation groups," said Cathy
Smith, the coalition's Washington D.C. coordinator.

2

"The

"Congress Completes Action on Alaskan Pipeline
Bill," 1973 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, (Washington
D . C . : Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1973), p. 605.
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state began selecting land in 1958, the natives got second
choice,

and the national interest is coming last."3

Established in late 1976, the Alaska Coalition
after called the lands coalition)

drew many of its members

from the Alaska Public Interest Coalition
the pipeline coalition).

(here

(hereafter called

Groups like the Wilderness Society,

the Sierra Cliiib, and the National Audubon Society were
reunited.

Eventually the coalition's ranks were swelled to

include such organizations as the United Auto Workers, the
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union, and the National
Council of Senior Citizens, and numerpus state and local groups.
Recalling Berry's description of the three types of
coalitions in which public interest groups are involved
(dependent, participatory, and independent)

it appears that

both the pipeline coalition and the lands coalition can be
identified as participatory coalitions.

Brock Evans of the

Sierra Club explained that the pipeline coalition was not/
an official, incorporated organization.
All these groups just got together infor
mally to work on the pipeline issue.
No
money was set aside for the coalition.
Expenses came out of the individual
budgets of the members.4
The temporary nature of the coalition should also be noted.
After their final defeat in 1973, the pipeline coalition
was disbanded with no immediate plans for the future.

Although

the lands coalition did have its own staff and possess a specific

3James R. Wagner, "The Alaska Lands Issue: Our Last
Frontier," Congressional Quarterly 35 (July 30, 1977): p. 1588.
4 "Congressional Quarterly Lobby Report," Congressional
Quarterly 32 (July 27, 1974): p. 1950.
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identity,

it too was organized around one specific issue, and

once that issue was resolved, the coalition disbanded.

The reason for the pipeline coalition's formation was
not.too complicated.

The primary goal, which was to prevent

construction of the pipeline and protect the wilderness in

Alaska from exploitation, is best summarized by David Brower's
February 5, 1971 column in the New York Times:
Alaska has known boom and bust before.
How many new ghosts does the oil industry
plan for Alaska?
Exotic grasses, planted
and advertised on graves hurriedly dug
on the Great Land's tundra, do not
rescue America's last great wilderness,
or responsibly aid the people who have
successfully inhabited this place for
millenia, developing there the most
enduring culture North America has
known.
Whose the quick profit, whose
the deprivation ever after. . ..We are
not obliged to use up wantonly what
ever oil resources we stumble into
simply because it is there, and
because after half evaluated studies
we imagine we know how to pipe it
safely to market.
This compares with the reasons behind the formation of
the lands coalition;

again for the protection of federal

wilderness areas in the 4 9th state.

The statement,

"Very

high secnic value, very high mineral value--classic w a r , "
underscores the problems involved.
When the Alaskan issues first arose, the environmentalist
movement had just recently concluded a successful three year
battle to eliminate government funding for the SST, and
had prevented construction of a jetport in the everglades of

^New York T i m e s , editorial, February 25, 1971.
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southern Florida.

However, the battle to defeat the pipeline

and later the attempts to protect the Alaskan lands would
prove to be much more difficult contests, against experienced
opponents, and involving some complicated strategies and
tactics.

The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to

an analysis of the strategies and tactics which were em
ployed.
As noted in chapter one, Jeffrey Berry described four
"strategies of influence" available to public interest
groups and their attempts to influence policy:
embarrassment and confrontation,
uency influence and pressure.

Law,

information, and constit

The pipeline coalition relied

primarily on two of these strategies of influence— "law"
and "information."

Additionally,

some of the tactics which

Berry lists under "constituency influence and pressure"
were occasionally utilized, but never in an organized manner.
The strategy of "embarrassment and confrontation" was not
employed because the coalition possessed enough influence
and legitimacy to achieve access into the political process
without relying on such overt attention-attracting tactics.
For the lands coalition the strategy of "law" was not
an option because the decision was to be made entirely in
Congress.

And as with the pipeline coalition,

"embarrassment

and confrontation" was not considered because it is such
an extreme action.

Instead, the coalition relied primarily

on the strategies of "information" and "constituency
influence and pressure."
The following pages of this section will consider the
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strategy of "law" as employed by the pipeline coalition.
This will be followed by a comparison of the strategy
"information" as it was utilized by both the pipeline
coalition and the lands coalition.

The chapter will end

with a comparison of the way each coalition employed the
strategy "constituency influence and pressure".

STRATEGY I - LAW
At first the strategy of legal confrontation proved
quite useful for the pipeline coalition.

Early in 197 0

Secretary Hickel was ready to issue a construction permit
to TAPS, allowing them to begin work on the 3 09 mile haul
road necessary for construction of the pipeline itself.
This approval was based on a short, ten-page impact state
ment which contained no environmental analysis, and which
had been filed for the haul road only, and not the

p i p e l i n e .

6

On that basis the coalition brought suit in federal district
court.
What was the purpose of taking the pipeline question
to court?

In chapter eleven of Interest Groups In American

Society, Harmon Zeigler discusses interest group participation
in the judicial process.

He notes that sometimes litigation

is used expressly as a delaying tactic, to allow the
plantiff additional time to prepare for a conflict which
will likely be resolved out of court.

This was apparently

true with regard to Wilderness Society v s . H i ckel.

Moorman's

£
Lynton K. Caldwell, Lynton R. Hayes and Isabel MacWhirter,
Citizens and the Environment (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1976), p. 233.
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request simply for an injunction, coupled with a request for
a fourteen day advance notice of intention to issue any
permits, underscores the temporary nature of the request.
The ultimate resolution of this issue would occur elsewhere.
Additionally, the entrance of various Canadian interests
into the process, allied as they were with the environmen
talists, would also prove to be a significant factor when
the decision-making location was moved to Capitol Hill.
According to Donald Hall, the original group may gain
greater access to decision makers, or the general public
through,
Channels open to, or controlled by, new
allies.
In each of these cases, the group
seeking cooperation with other groups will
attempt to utilize the cooperative form of
organization...to expand the original
group's influence^
This idea is echoed by Byron C. Kennard, of the Conservation
Foundation, who said,

"The most urgently important thing for

the environmental movement to do is to associate its priorities
with other communities of interest."^
Canadian participants,

The involvement of the

first the conservationists,

on Canadian pipeline representatives,
of a "community of interest."

and later

is an excellent example

One whose participation was

made possible by the legal delay tactics of the coalition.
For the most part, the coalition's strategy of litigation

n

Donald R. Hall, Cooperative Lobbying - The Power of
Pressure (Tucson, A Z . : University of Arizona Press, 1969), p. 66
^James R. Wagner, "Environment Groups Shifts Tactics
From Demonstrations to Politics, Local Action," National
Journal 3 (July 24, 1971): p. 1563.
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can be termed successful.

It had been almost four years

since TAPS first proposed to build the 800 mile long pipe
line.

During that time the coalition had successfully

fought the pipeline interests to a standstill in the courts.
The issue was brought to the forefront of the public's
attention,

and they were now ready to prusue it in Congress.

STRATEGY II - INFORMATION
Once the issue was in Congress,
was forced to adopt other strategies.

the pipeline coalition
One very important

strategy which they utilized was "information".

This is

the action of making your point of view public and presenting
it before decision-makers

(both officially and u n o f f i cially).

Information also played an important part in the land
coalition's efforts.
according to Berry,

A group which relies on this strategy,
can employ such tactics as congressional

testimony, personal lobbying,
and internal publicity.

and releasing research results

The pipeline coalition concentrated

especially on congressional testimony, with a lesser emphasis
on lobbying.

On the other hand,

the lands coalition put

major emphasis on their lobbying efforts, with relatively
minor efforts directed towards testimony and no releasing
of research results.

This section begins first by comparing

the use of congressional testimony.
The pipeline coalition at first welcomed congressional
participation,

because of anticipated bi-partisan support

in both the House and Senate.

As early as May 1972,

a

group of twenty-three Senators and m o r e than eighty Rep
resentatives were calling for further public hearings
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concerning the Interior Department's final impact report.

9

Senate Majority Whip Robert P. Griffin sent a letter to
Morton urging serious consideration of the Canadian route
and- further hearings.
The only public hearings to date on the
proposed pipeline were held by the Depart
ment a year a g o . ..They are clearly inadequate.
Since then the Canadian alternative has
become more attractive, (and) several
changes have been proposed in the Alaska
pipeline.10
However,

Zeigler and Peak believe that congressional

testimony is generally thought to be,

"of doubtful value

in the communication of influence..."'^

In Berry's survey

of lobbying techniques,

forty-two percent of the public

interest lobbyists surveyed felt that such testimony was,
"not effective."

12

He states that testifying before committees

is usually thought of as having simply symbolic value because,
"appearing at hearings helps to legitimize further efforts
13
to influence legislation."
Although they were unsuccessful in getting further
hearings on the environmental impact report, the coalition
was able to testify in regard to other aspects of the

9

"Alaskan Oil: Legal Battle Promised on Pipeline,"
Congressional Quarterly 30 (May 20, 1972): p. 1130.
Ibid.
"^Harmon Zeigler, Interest Groups in American Society
(Englewood Cliffs, N . J . : Prentice Hall, 1964), p. 139.
12
Jeffrey M. Berry, Lobbying for the People (Princeton
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 223.
13Ibid.
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pipeline.

Testimony before Senator Jackson's Interior

Committee was especially heavy.

The purpose here was to

marshal congressional support for legislation which would
defer approval of the pipeline,

so that studies of the

trans-Canada route could be examined.
We have an excellent coalition of forces
who are working very hard to try to con
vince the Senate Interior Committee that
this is no time to rush ahead with the
right-of-way bill, but to wait for
further information.14
This, the goal of George Alderson,

legislative director of

the Friends of the Earth.
Yet, as might have been predicted,
to little avail.

such testimony came

The bill that Jackson's Interior Committee

reported out to the full Senate was a disappointment.
Not only did it recommend approval, but it stated that any
further delays for additional studies would have little
positive value.

The only bright spot was that the publicity

generated by such public discussion of the issues resulted
in The New York T i m e s , Washington P o s t , and Boston Globe
printing editorials against the pipeline and in favor of
an extended delay to study other proposals.*^
The tactic of congressional testimony was of relatively
minor importance for the lands coalition's efforts, however
they were able to use the hearings effectively and illustrate

14

"Alaska Pipeline: New Energy Environment Clash
Looms," Congressional Quarterly 31 (March 31, 1973):
p. 724.
15
Donald J. Patterson, Jr. "Environmental Groups and
The Alaska (D) (.2). Lands," (Senior Honors Thesis, College
of William and Mary, 1979), p. 44.
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the lands issue as a national one, concerning more than just
Alaska and Alaskans.

Udall and Seiberlings1s decision to

hold hearings across the country dramatized that fact.
. The first major act of the coalition was to get
members and supporters to turn out at these hearings. 16
Representatives from thirteen seperate organizations testified
on behalf of a strong pro-environmentalist bill.

17

Although

this was not a crucial factor in the ultimate resolution
of the issue, using the tactic of congressional testimony
to establish the nation-wide concern for the lands issue was
an important step in getting environmentally strict legis
lation passed.
When comparing the efforts of the two coalitions it
appears that the pipeline coalition relied on testimony
as a means of making substantive progress towards their
goal, while the lands coalition relied on it primarily
as a symbolic tool to make a relatively small but effective
point.

This would seem to confirm the conclusions of

both Milbrath and Berry who found that testimony was one
of the least favored ways of achieving access into the
decision making process.

The pipeline coalition put a

great deal of time and effort into a relatively unimportant

16

Patterson,
L a n d s ," p. 44.
17

"Environmental Groups and the Alaska

U.S. House, "Inclusion of Alaska Lands m Natural
Park, Forest, Wildlife Refuge and Wild and Scenic Rivers
Systems," Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Interior
and Insular Affairs on H.R. 3 9 , H.R. 1974, H.R. 2876, H .R.
5 565, 95th Congress, 1st session, 1977, Table of Contents,
p. iii, iv, v.
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activity— possibly to the exclusion of other activities— and
ended up with very little to show for it.

The lands coaliton

did not put much effort into the process— pursuing it for
its.symbolic value alone— and was successful in the process.
This was to set the pattern for both sides in their future
e ndeavors.
Another tactic under the information strategy, which
both coalitions relied on, was direct and personal lobbying.
This tactic of influence is favored by a majority of lobbyists.
According to Milbrath, eighty percent of the respondents
said that they prefer direct methods over indirect methods.

18

He claims that Congressmen and their staffs also feel that
individual presentations are important.

19

Fifty-three percent

of the public interest group lobbyists said they believe
personal lobbying to be "effective," or "very effective."
The pipeline opponents concentrated on lobbying after the
pipeline bill was reported to the full Senate.

The lands

coalition lobbied members of Congress heavily throughout
the course of the issue.
Mary C. Berry says that by the time the Senate took
up the bill on July 9, 1973, William Foster
for Alyeska)

(Chief lobbyist

and other oil lobbyists, aided by the looming

energy crisis, had succeeded in subtly altering the contro
versy.
built;

"No longer was the question should the pipeline be
it had become where should the pipeline be built,

18

Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation
Rand McMally, 1965), p. 212.
19T, . ,
Ibid.

(Chicago:
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a different issue altogether."

20

The coalition's efforts

in favor of a Canadian route seem to be an acknowledgement
of this situation.
As previously mentioned,
amendments on the floor.

there were to be two major

One was Senator Gravel's pro

pipeline amendment, the other was the pro-environment
Mondale-Bayh amendment.

Although the coalition was ready

to lobby for the Mondale-Bayh amendment,

it appears they

made a major error in not being prepared to deal with the
emergence of the Gravel amendment.
We spent most of our time and efforts
building up the credibility o£ the
Canadian alternative, said Richard
M. Lahn of the Sierra Club.
Nobody
paid much attention to the Gravel
amendment until about ten days before
the Senate vote.
Until then there
had not been any sign that the other
side was lobbying hard on the NEPA
issue, and it just didn't seem possible
to lose on this. 2 -*Yet Alyeska had been working on the proposal for some
time.

Said William Foster,
Alyeska spotted a very realistic
opportunity and worked for the
Senate amendment.
All the owner
companies, and their friends were
^o
talking to anyone they knew up there.

The coaliton's lobbying efforts, on the other hand,
were poorly organized.

20

Even after the Senate defeated

Berry, Lobbying for the People, p. 269.

21

Richard Corrigan and Claude Barfield, "Pipeline Lobby
Uses Its Political Muscle to Bypass Environmental L a w . "
National Journal 5 (August 11, 1973): p. 1177.
22

Ibid.
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the Mondale-Bayh amendment and voted its support for the
NEPA exclusion, there was still an opportunity to delay a
decision in the House until after the summer recess.
Working out of the office facilities
made available to them by Representative
John J. Moakley, they attempted to
contact by telephone or through personal
visits as many House members as possible.
But, said George Alderson of Friends of
the Earth, "We just didn't have sufficient 23
staff or organization to get to everybody."
Richard Lahn of the Sierra club voiced a similar opinion.
I knew we were in trouble when I was
sitting in Representative Claude
Pepper's office making a pitch to two
summer interns, and who breezes by me
but the ARCO lobbyists* (Pepper voted
to override the NEPA)
In the end, said Gladys Kessler,

"There just wasn't enough

time to mobilize a save-the-NEPA campaign around the
country as we had done last year."

25

H.R.

9081 passed the

House by a vote of 356 to 60.
Five years later, beginning in 197 8 , representatives
of the lands coalition lobbied members of Congress throughout
the entire course of the issue.
P o s t , printed after H.R.
Committee,

An article in the Washington

39 had cleared the House Interior

reported that both pro-environment and pro-develop

ment lobbyists,

"Have leaned heavily on members of the Interior

Committee in recent months and are certain to lean just as

23

Corrigan and Barfield,
Political Muscle." p. 1178
2 4Ibid.
. -j
Ibid.
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heavily on all members of Congress in the months ahead."

26

In discussing the lobbying efforts Representative Seiberling
said,

"I never saw such lobbying m

my whole life."

27

One House staff member, who works for a
Congressman on the subcommittee, stated
that the members of the coalition made
"frequent visits," and that they kept
coming in as the bill went all the way
up in subcommittee, committee and then
full House.
He also said that eight
different people were in contact with
his office alone.
Other replies from
congressional staff people reinforce
this idea that the Alaska Coalition
2q
was very active in its lobbying efforts.
Again the evidence seems to suggest that the pipeline
coalition failed to achieve the des'ired effects from their
lobbying attempts, while the lands coalition enjoyed a
certain amount of success,

especially in the House.

can be said, then, about the two coalitions'

What

lobbying efforts?

Milbrath says that there are three variables which
are significant in determining the success of a.lobbying
effort.

First,

the lobbyist must be knowledgeable.

29

It

is generally very difficult for a congressman or his staff
to gather all the information needed to make an accurate
decision on many issues.

Any group which can provide them

with the information needed will therefore have greater access
to these decisions and will be able to influence the

26

"Carving Up Alaska," Washington P o s t , editorial,
March 19, 1978.
27

(D)

Patterson, "Environmental Groups and the Alaska
(2) Lands," p. 46.

29

. .
. . .
Milbrath, Political Participation, p. 221-225.

decisions made by them.

Holtzman discusses this idea in

Interest Groups and Lob b y ing;
Since legislators want and need staff aid,
interest groups seek opportunities to supply
such services.
To the extent that they can,
they strengthen their reservoir of good will
and their potential for influence.
At the
same time, it must be understood that the
providing of services is in itself a means
for directly affecting legislative policy.
Although the pipeline coalition members were all very know
ledgeable,

they did not provide "useful" information for

the majority of the House and Senate members they sought
to influence.

A synthesis of the various arguments which

were presented to Congress by Alyeska^ and the pipeline
coalition shows why this is true.
pipeline,

In support of the

advocates argued:

1. Congress has the right to direct the Interior
Department to issue the permits.
2. In doing so, the NEPA would not be gutted, since
it applies to actions by federal agencies and
not Congress.
3. The pipeline has already been subjected to a
seven million dollar environmental impact study
as called for by the NEPA.
4. It is past time to begin construction of the
two-million-barrel-a-day pipeline because of
our balance of payments and national security
problems raised by a dependence on overseas oil.
In defense of the NEPA, and against the pipeline, these points
were m a d e :
1. The Interior Department's environmental impact
report was deliberately stacked against the

^ A b r a h a m Holtzman, Interest Groups and Lobbying
The MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 89.

(New York
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Canada alternative, thereby thwarting the
process of judicial review.
2. By exempting this project t Congress is
setting a dangerous precedent.
3. Congress should not attempt to prohibit
citizens from exercising their rights
to challenge government actions. 31
Clearly the most damaging argument against the coalition was
the need for additional supplies of oil which the pipeline
would provide.
to refute this.

The coalition had no real basis on which
On the other hand, their own arguments;

were weak, generally critical of Congress or the Interior
Department,

and difficult to defend in the face of consistuents

angered over the lack of gasoline for their automobiles.
Said Representative Donald H. Clausen of California:
We simply cannot afford the luxury of
bringing all developments to a stand
still while our country faces the
dilemma of major energy problems,
inflated prices, balance-of-payments
problems... and a slow but forward
moving erosion of the confidence of
our people in the will of government
to solve problems. ^2
It seems that a great many Congressmen wanted to make
a stand in public on their determination to fight the energy
crisis.

For all their knowledge, the coalition was unable

to provide any information which was useful in this regard.
They could claim the citizen*s right to litigation, and the
necessity to preserve the NEPA, but they could not show how

31
'Corrigan and Barfield,
Muscle," p. 1178.
32
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stopping the pipeline would not hurt the country energy-wise.
For many Congressman there was no other choice but to give
the pipeline a green light.
said,

An aid to Senator Jackson

"A lot of Senators wanted to do something about the

energy crisis and this was their first opportunity to show
their concern.
By way of comparison, the lands coalition's lobbyists
were knowledgeable,

and they provided the House and Senate

staffs with what was described as "good, workable information
It was described at various times as "factual,"

"to,the point

"concise," and "detailed when detail was needed."

Their

data was also "organized in the way that was most useful to
the staff people and Congressmen."

35

Many of the staffers, however, saw it as
being biased.
As one put it, "I believe
what they print, but I don't feel they
always put everything into print though."
Another stated that they, "may not tell
you the whole story, but if they tell you
something, you didn't have to question it."
However, most, if not all, lobbyists
present information which is at least
somewhat biased towards their position,
either by being selective in what is
presented or in terms of the content
itself.
Congressional staff people
are aware of this and take factual
data with the assumption that it is
biased from each l o b b y . 36
The quality of information and the manner in which it

33

Corrigan and Barfield,
Muscle," p. 1172.
34
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was presented is one factor which hurt the pipeline coalition's
efforts, and helped the lands coalition's efforts.

A second

factor which could have helped both of them was belief in
their cause.

Milbrath points out that,

"the advocate who

is not personally convinced is less successful in pleading
his case."

37

Berry found that individuals who work for public

interest groups are generally very committed to what they
were doing.
If there was one thing that was clear from
the respondent's attitudes during the inter
views, it was that their work is not just
a job.
There wasn't a single activist who
gave any indication of anything but^gtrong
commitment to organizational goals.
All the evidence indicates that the members of both
coalitions were,

indeed, dedicated to their causes.

By

1973 the battle against the pipeline was almost five years
old, and many of the participants had involved since the
start— evidence of a certain amount of dedication.

Additionally,

many of the lands coalition members had come from Alaska to
Washington to work expressly on that issue, indicating the
strength of their commitment.

And all the coalition members

worked for less pay than their industry counterparts.
The problem is that this is more of a negative factor
than a positive one.
while beneficial,

That is, strong belief in your cause,

in no way guarantees your success; yet its

absence can significantly reduce your chances.

The effect was

37
JVIilbrath, Political Participation, p. 223.
38

Berry, Lobbying for the People, p. 100.
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that the faith of both coalitions'

in their causes helped

them, but it did not play a major role in determining the
outcome.
Another important factor according to Milbrath,

is

using the "soft-sell approach" when trying to influence
Congressmen.

It is apparent that the pipeline coalition,

with its constant and discordant pleadings, was felt to be
pushing too hard at times.

This was a significant con

tributor to the backlash which took place in Congress.
Three months ago we were confident this
(NEPA exclusion) amendment wouldn't pick
more than fifteen votes. ..The turnabout
is astonishing.
There is ho doubt now ^ 9
that there is an environmental backlash.
Alaska's Senator Stevens, never a fan of the anti-pipeline
forces, said on July 17,

"There is no way to start a pipe

line without stopping all the litigation of these environmental extremists."
coalition's cause.

40

Perceptions such as these hurt the

Yet there was virtually no way to

counteract such an image once it had developed.
The same criticism applies to the lands coalition.
congressional staff person said that they,
so strongly that they turn people off.

"push their point

If they were a little

more tactful, they would be welcomed more."

41

While extremism

such as this may lead to a backlash in some offices,

39

■
Corrigan and Barfield,
Political Muscle," p. 1172.
40
41

(D)

One

it does

.
"Pipeline Lobby Uses its

1^73 Congressional Quarterly A l m anac, p . 600.

Patterson, "Environmental Groups and the Alaska
(2) Lands," p. 50.
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not seem to have had a major negative effect on the coalition's
lobbying efforts.

As one aide put it,

"The industries are

tough, the labor unions are tough, the environmentalists are
tough.

You've got to be."

42

It appears that although they may have acted overzealously, the lands coalition was able to retain an air
of professionalism while the pipeline coalition was pictured
by many as extremists.

This was certainly a contributing

factor in the outcome of the two issues.
STRATEGY III - CONSTITUENCY INFLUENCE AND PRESSURE
The final strategy that Berry discusses relevant to
this study, is called "constituency influence and pressure."
Utilization of this strategy occurs primarily when interest
groups urge their members to write letters to, or otherwise
pressure, their congressmen.

It can also include releasing

information about a congressman,
voting record.

such as publicizing his

In this instance both coalitions relied

almost exclusively on the first of these: working for a
grass-roots campaign.

However the pipeline coalition did

not put nearly as much effort into their attempts as did the
lands coalition.
In all the published reports of the coalition's
activities there is little memtion of such tactics.

In

1971 the Wilderness Society, on behalf of the coalition,
mailed out copies of a newsletter entitled:

42

(D)

"Alaska Alert:

Patterson, "Environmental Groups and the Alaska
(2) Lands," p. 50.
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Russian Roulette in the Arctic," which urged readers to
testify or submit statements against the project.

43

Addition

ally, the Sierra Club published a "Battle Book," called
O i l •On Ice,

44

which was sent to both club members and mem

bers of Congress.

This contained the usual call to members,

urging them to write the congressmen.
The Sierra Club also distributed a packet of clippings
and statements, complete with picture order forms and
suggestions on what concerned citizens could do to fight the
pipeline.

Finally,

paper add entitled,

in early 1973 the coalition ran a news
"From those wonderful people who brought

you the energy crisis— the trans-Alaska pipeline."

45

This

add listed those members of congress who were involved in
making the key decisions,

and urged readers to write them

and let them know they were opposed to the pipeline.
The lands coalition used the publications of its member
organizations and sent out alerts to its membership in order
to encourage grass-root participation.
Not Man Apart magazine,
this message:

Friends of the Earth's

in its May-June 1978 edition,

included

"If ever there was an issue about which to

write your legislators,

this is it.

Please write, badger,

pester your representatives and employers.

Don't let them

43

Richard Corrigan, "Settlement of Native Land Claims
Could Affect Alaska Pipeline Controversy," National Journal
3 (April 17, 1971): p. 839.
44
45

Brown, Oil On I c e .

Corrigan and Barfield,
Political Muscle," p. 1174.
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off the h o o k . ..Write, Write, Write."

46

An editorial in

the June 197 8 Sierra magazine echoed these sentiments.
"Now is a critical time for you to write your Representatives and Senators."

47

Additionally, the coalition sent

out these alerts, whenever possible,
votes in either the House or Senate.

immediately to critical
In these they would

urge the recipients to write, telephone,

or meet with

important decision-makers as soon as possible.

The Alaska

Coalition Hotline was also established to keep the active
.
.
. 4 8
members of the coalition informed on what was happening.
Morris Udall called the campaign the,

"most impressive

grass-roots effort since the civil rights issue."

49

Many

congressional aides reported receiving a great deal of
constituent input favorable to the coalition's position.
Commenting on the effort, Bob Skowcroft,
of the coalition said,

an active member

"We blew them away."

50

There is no rreal accurate way of measuring the effec
tiveness of actions such as these.

However,

it is doubtful

that such tactics could have made the difference in the
pipeline battle,

even if organized in a logical and effective

46

Jeffrey Knight, "The Fight to Save Alaska— Because
It is There," Not Man A p a r t , (May-June, 1978): p. 2.
47

Edgar Wayburn,
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manner.

The loose structure of the coalition, their

emphasis on litigation and testimony to the exclusion of
effective lobbying,

combined with the power and influence

of the oil lobby and the effects of the emerging energy
crisis, all combined to produce the ultimate failure of
the Alaska Public Interest Coalition.
In comparison, the lands coalition was able to combine
knowledgeable lobbyists, useful information,

and effective

congressional testimony with an organized grass-roots
appeal and a broad based coalition structure.

This helped

them achieve their goal of strict.environmental protection
for the federal lands in Alaska.
Fortunately there was no single dominant issue around
which their adversaries could gather,

like the still-new

energy crisis of 1973, and organize their opposition.

And

the lands coalition enjoyed the support of the Administration
while the pipeline coalition did not.
evidence of this chapter indicates,

However, as the

it was the ineffective

use of the strategies of influence by the pipeline coalition
from 196 8 through 19 73, and their subsequent effective employ
ment by the lands coalition five years later, which played
the most important part in the passage of the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973 and the protection of
federal

(d)

(.2) lands in 1978.

CHAPTER FIVE

The development of public policy— the laws which govern
our society— is the result of a number of factors.

These

include dominant political events, such as war or other
international upheavals, the legislators involved and the
attitudes of his or her constituents, political parties,
and the interest groups which actively seek to influence
policy development.
Interest groups are especially important in this
process.

As Holtzman noted:
Political action by organized interest
groups is a fundamental phenomenon of
modern democratic societies ... (They).
constitute the principle ayenue outside
of official public government through
which political power is marshaled,,
and applied . 1

In Federalist Paper #1 0 , James Madison pointed out that
conflict between interest groups is to be expected in society.
Where freedom exists,

factions will almost always form and

attempt to use government to protect and preserve their
interests.
Interest groups can be divided into two categories—
private interest groups and public interest groups.

There

are several differences between the two, the most important
of which is that a private interest group works for self-gain,

^Abraham Holtzman, Interest Groups and Lobbying
(New York: The MacMillian Company, 1966); p . ~ 1
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or on behalf of the specific group it represents, while a
public interest group seeks a collective good, the achieve
ment of which will not selectively benefit the membership
of the activists of the organization.

Berry notes the

variety of strategies and tactics that public interest groups
can use in their attempts to influence policy.
the use of law, embarrassment and confrontation,

These include
information,

and constituency influence and pressure.
The topic of this study has been one specific type
of public interest group— environmental organizations.
Their participation in policy development is a relatively
new phenomenon,

although organizations like the Audubon

Society and the Sierra Club have worked in this area through
out most of the century.
One of the most important actions that an environmental
organization, or indeed any public interest group, can take
is to form a coalition with other groups of the same persuasion.
In all the sources cited,

coalition formation, or joint

activities with other groups, was noted to be an important
factor in successful attempts to influence policy development.
Deakin noted that virtually every major issue that comes
before Congress involved some type of coalition lobbying,
and that lobbyists had put much faith in such efforts.

2

The subjects of this study were two such public interest
group coalitions:

2

The Alaska Public Interest Coalition

James Deakin, The Lobbyists
Affairs Press, 1966), p. 219.

(the

(Washington D.C.: Public
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pipeline coalition)
coalition).

and the Alaska Coalition

(the lands

The similarity of the two coalitions, combined

'with their varying degrees of success, have been helpful in
analyzing those factors which contribute to the success or
failure of a coalition*s lobbying efforts.
One important factor is the composition of coalitions
seeking to influence public policy.

As evidenced by this

study, a successful coalition should be as broadly based
as possible and include a varied assortment of interest
groups from throughout the country.

This aids in estab

lishing the interest being pursued as one of national impor
tance, effecting individuals from many walks of life.

Not

only does this add legitimacy to the coalition's efforts,
but it also indicates to the decision makers involved the
wider implications of this public policy question.
The success of the lands coalition becomes rather more
probable,

comprised as it was of many varied interest groups;

including environmentalists,

unions,

liberals, and elites.

This compares with the pipeline coalition which was comprised
of many separate groups, but few separate interests.

A vote

against the pipeline coalition would therefore alienate mainly
environmentalists, whereas a vote against the lands coalition
would upset individuals from different interest groups
throughout society.
It is also important to have the support of the executive
branch,

especially the President.

as one individual,
country.

This is because the President,

commands considerable attention in this

His ability to speak out on any issue and have it
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widely reported can be a tremendous asset.

This is in

addition to the P r e s i d e n t s ability to personally discuss
issues with key members of Congress and line up support
from the rank and file on both sides.
The importance of the President's role in this study
is evidenced by the failure of the pipeline coalition during
Nixon's Administration and the success of the lands coalition
during Carter's.

Nixon was not supportive of the environ

mentalists and his executive branch appointees opposed them
throughout the five year ordeal.

On the other hand, Carter

was clearly sympathetic to the lands coalition and supported
them because of his feelings.

His appointees, especially

Secretary Andrus, were quite helpful in passing pro-environment
legislation and in protecting the federal lands.

The impor

tance of the chief executive is even more clearly evidenced
by the willingness of the lands coalition to compromise when
Ronald Reagan became President.
In attempting to influence Congress, another important
factor is proper channelling of the information the
coalition wishes to provide.

A common mistake here is to

concentrate on Congressional testimony.

Although it is part

of the Congressional information gathering process, testimony
often serves merely a symbolic function.

Many times testimony

is lined up to conform with preconceived Congressional opinions.
Most experienced lobbyists rate its usefulness as low, pre
ferring to expend their efforts in other directions.
Coalition members should instead concentrate more on
personal lobbying.

The best way to get across the information
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one wishes to communicate is by personal contact with the
individuals who will make the decisions.

This may require

considerable skill and experience on the part of the coalition
members, but its importance should not be under-emphasized.
Directly related to this is the usefulness of the infor
mation being presented.

The prime interest of any member of

Congress is to be re-elected.

To do this he or she must be

perceived as doing what is best for his or her constituents,
and the country as a whole.

For a coalition to attract the

support of a Congressman,it must be able to show how support
for its position is best for all concerned.
shown,

As has been

failure to employ this one factor can significantly

reduce a coalition's chance for success.
These factors, along with effective use of personal
lobbying and grass-roots pressure, are some of the more
important factors affecting the success of coalition lobbying
which have been illustrated by this study.

Coalition lobbying

remains today one of the most effective ways for small and
diverse public interest groups to participate in the
democratic process.
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